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BOLD PROMISES BUT BABY STEPS: MARYLAND'S
GROWTH POLICY TO THE YEAR 2020
Philip J. Tierneyt
BACKGROUND: THE VISIONS OF 2020

I.

The Chesapeake Bay (the Bay) is the nation's major estuarine
system and its 64,000 square mile watershed includes portions of six
states.· The Bay represents an enormous economic resource with
impact along the entire eastern seaboard;2 its commercial and recreational amenities are responsible for attracting many of the fifteen
million people who reside within its watershed. 3 Yet poorly regulated
development is destroying huge chunks of farmland, forests, and
environmentally sensitive areas which directly affect the Bay, 4 and
these development patterns threaten its environmental health. 5 Maryland alone is predicted to lose 240,000 acres of farmland and 307,000
t B.S., University of Notre Dame, 1958; J.D., Catholic University of America,

I.
2.
3.

4.
5.

1968. Mr. Tierney is Director of the Office of Zoning and Administrative
Hearings for Montgomery County, Maryland, as well as a member of the
adjunct faculties at the University of Baltimore School of Law and Washington
College of Law of the American University where he teaches courses in land
use law. This Article represents the opinions of the author and does not
necessarily represent the views of Montgomery County Government, the University of Baltimore, or the American University.
The author gratefully acknowledges the encouragement and helpful comments provided on earlier versions of this Article by land use law colleagues
Stanley D. Abrams, John J. Delaney, Shelley Wasserman, and Peter Max
Zimmerman, as well as the valuable review and editorial work provided by
University of Baltimore law students Elizabeth Stanat and Heidi Levine. This
assistance improved the clarity and content of the Article. The author is solely
responsible for remaining deficiencies.
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON GROWTH IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY REGION PROTECTING THE FUTURE: A VISION FOR MARYLAND, at 7 (Jan. 1991) [hereinafter
BAY REPORT].
RANDALL T. KERHIN, ET AL., REPORT ON THE CHESAPEAKE BAY EARTH SCIENCE
STUDY, MARYLAND GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 3 (Spring 1977) [hereinafter BAY STUDY).
BAY STUDY, supra note 2, at 3; THE YEAR 2020 PANEL, POPULATION GROWTH
AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY WATERSHED TO THE YEAR 2020,
at 25 (Dec. 1988) [hereinafter 2020 REPORT); Invitation to Join, Chesapeake
Bay Foundation Fact Sheet, at I (Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Annapolis,
Md.) (1991) (on file with author).
See 2020 REPORT, supra note 3, at 29-30; see also BAY REPORT, supra note I,
at 7.
ECONOMIC GROWTH, RESOURCE PROTECTION, & PLANNING COMMISSION, 1993
REPORT, at 34-35 (Dec. I, 1993) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT).
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acres of forests to development by the year 2020. 6 To save the Bay,
growth must be redirected to areas more suitable for development. 7
For approximately seventy years, most states 8 relinquished responsibility for planning and land use regulation to local governments. 9 While some local governments generated innovative land use
regulations designed to promote environmental objectives,1O most
localities contributed to environmental degradation through lax regulation of development motivated primarily by economic considerations and parochial attitudes .. 1 Since the 1950s, these lax regulatory

6. BAY REPORT, supra note I, at 7; BAY STUDY, supra note 2, at 3; 2020 REPORT,
supra note 3, at 18-24; Tom Horton, The Last Skipjack, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
June 13, 1993, at 32.
7. See, e.g., BAY REPORT, supra note I, at 9-12; BAY STUDY, supra note 2, at 3;
2020 REPORT, supra note 3, at 35-40.
8. State enabling laws were adopted during the 1920s and local governments were
generally delegated full planning and zoning responsibilities. Since the 1970s,
a growing number of states have retrieved some of this responsibility in order
to address regional and environmental concerns. See Frank J. Popper, Understanding American Land Use Regulation Since 1970, J. OF THE AM. PLAN.
ASS'N, Spring 1988, at 291; see also 2020 REPORT, supra note 3, at 2-4.
9. See Popper, supra note 8, at 291. On the whole, local governments have an
undistinguished record in exercising this delegated responsibility, especially with
respect to environmental and regional concerns. JOHN M. DEGROVE, NEW
FRONTIER FOR LAND POLICy-PLANNING AND GROWTH MANAGEMENT IN THE
STATES 2 (1992); Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning After 70 Years,
N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 24, 1986, at A19.
10. These innovative techniques are discussed in Part IV of this Article. They were
all developed by local governments. This is one of the major successes of local
land use regulation. Haar & Kayden, supra note 9.
II. 2020 REPORT, supra note 3, at 2. Tom Horton, an author and leading advocate
for sensible and managed growth, recently observed:
Imagine that we had set out a couple of decades ago to protect the
nation's air and water without any national Clean Air Act or Clean
Water Act. Imagine that we had, instead, left it up to county commissions, boards of supervisors and town councils across the land. It
would have been a polluter's dream: localities by the thousands
relaxing and waiving environmental standards to keep or attract
industry; rural officials succumbing to the onslaught of corporations
with bottomless legal and financial resources; a bewildering hodgepodge of air-and water-quality rules, ranging from downright exclusionary to anything goes.
It would have been a mess.
Yet this same parochial approach to environmental protection,
long ago deemed disastrous for our air and water, has been zealously
enshrined for the protection of land-the third pillar of environmental
quality. "Local control" is the mantra here, and with few exceptions,
land use is controlled by counties and towns.
And it has been a mess.
Of course, land is different, the argument often goes. For the
most part, land is privately and locally owned, and thus rightly a
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patterns have produced unplanned sprawl development l2 with unintended but harmful environmental consequences,l3 while other more
suitable areas have been bypassed. 14 Sprawl development places unlocal issue. But the environmental impacts of poor land use are no
more private, or confined to political boundaries, than the ashy plume
from a tall smokestack, or the discharge from a sewage plant washing
downstream.
Tom Horton, An Ounce oj Prevention, MID-ATLANTIC COUNTRY, July 1993,
at 24.
12. Sprawl development is described in the following manner: "Under the sprawl
pattern of development, new growth would follow its present trend of expanding
outward in all directions at low densities, seeking always the lowest priced
land. Sprawl takes place naturally in the absence of energetic and coordinated
public policies to guide new growth .... " THE MARYLAND NATIONAL CAPITAL
PARK & PLANNING COMM'N, ... ON WEDGES AND CORRIDORs-A GENERAL
PLAN FOR THE MARYLAND-WASHINGTON REGIONAL DISTRICT 136 (Jan. 22, 1964)
[hereinafter GENERAL PLAN). James W. Rouse, the developer of Columbia,
Maryland, and the New Town located in central Howard County, described
sprawl from a developer's viewpoint: "Sprawl is inefficient. It stretches out
the distances people must travel to work, to shop, to worship, to play ....
Sprawl is ugly, oppressive, massively dull. It squanders the resources of natureforests, streams, hillsides-and produces vast, monotonous armies of housing
and graceless, tasteless clutter." James W. Rouse, Cities that Work for ManVictory Ahead, Address at the Lion's International/University of Puerto Rico
Symposium on "The City of the Future" 2 (Oct. 18, 1967) (on file with
author).
Local governments are motivated to promote sprawl by economic considerations including an increased tax base. High income residents generally occupy
the homes built in these low density areas and the housing patterns established
by sprawl generally discourage affordable housing. See HOWARD COUNTY 1990
GENERAL PLAN, A SIX POINT PLAN FOR THE FUTURE 59 (July 2, 1990).
13. These consequences include toxic runoff, loss of pervious surfaces, increased
sedimentation and soil erosion, and water pollution. BAY REPORT, supra note
I, at 7; see also DEGRovE, supra note 9, at 18, 34; Beach Pollution Watch,
WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1994, at A9 (Maryland ranked fifth in the number of
beach closings due to polluted water in 1993).
14. See, e.g., 2020 REPORT, supra note 3, at 18-19; Tom Horton, This Land Is
My Land, MID-ATLANTIC COUNTRY, May 1993, at 22. Horton vividly portrays
the problem:
At local levels, where most of the land-use power resides, we zone
virtually every acre of our farmland and forest land for residential
lots, then wonder why growth occurs willy-nilly, and not in the areas
where it makes sense-in the areas where development, and the sewers
and roads and schools to serve it, already exist.
The result is sprawl development and strip malls that chew up
huge amounts of remaining natural lands, erode our agricultural base,
suck the commercial life out of our cities and small towns, and are
just downright ugly. To compensate, we regulate piecemeal at the
state and federal level-protecting trees, protecting shoreline, protecting farmland, protecting wetlands. Given the mess we have made of
planning and zoning for growth, this band-aid approach is a necessary
alternative to environmental deterioration.
[d. at 25.
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anticipated burdens on local governments in the form of infrastructure overload as roads, schools, and other public facilities are stretched
beyond their intended capacities. 15 Sprawl development encourages
the migration of high income residents from the cities to suburbia 16
and, as a result, the central cities are experiencing declining population, decreased tax base, and waning political influence.17 These
trends threaten long term social and environmental problems.
The harmful environmental consequences of unmanaged growth
prompted state action, particularly in Maryland, which is the most
affected by the environmental degradation of the Bay because it is
host to the largest portion of Bay waters. IS Since 1970, Maryland
has adopted a number of environmental laws including wetlands
protection,19 state control over water and sewage programs,20 tree
preservation,21 farmland preservation,22 and a regional critical area
program that curtails development within one thousand feet of affected waters and wetlands. 23 While these piecemeal programs achieved
limited success in addressing their particular problems, other more
comprehensive remedies are necessary to adequately protect the Bay
from the consequences of unmanaged growth. 24
15. The belief that sprawl development is an economic benefit for local governments
may be based on invalid assumptions. A study of the government of Loudon
County, Virginia, concluded that the fiscal impact of sprawl development on
local government exceeds the increased public revenue from an expanded tax
base. AMERICAN FARMLAND TRUST, DENSITy-RELATED PUBLIC COSTS 5-6 (1986);
see also DEGROVE, supra note 9, at 9, 14, 34; GENERAL PLAN, supra note 12,
at 136.
16. See GENERAL PLAN, supra note 12, at 136.
17. The fragmentation of metropolitan areas has magnified the gap between growth
and local government's capacity to respond with a consistent and rational
growth policy for the efficient allocation of resources. Michael deCourcy Hinds
& Erik Eckholm, 80s Legacy: States and Cities in Need, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
1990, § 1, at 1; see Marshall V. Kaplan & Peggy Cuciti, Reconciling Fragmented
Local Government and Infrastructure Services, LAND USE IN TRANSITION (Urban
Land Institute, Washington, D.C.), 1993, at 26-31; David Rusk, Suburban
Renewal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1993, at A23; Roberto Suro, Where America
Is Growing: The Suburban Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,1991, § I, at 1; Roberto
Suro, Where Have All the Jobs Gone? Follow the Crab Grass, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 1991, § 4, at 5; Barbara Vobejda, Half of Population Lives in Urban
Areas, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1991, at AI.
18. About 1,726 square miles, which is more than half the Bay, lies within
Maryland. DIANE P. FRESE, ET AL., MARYLAND MANUAL, A GUIDE TO MARYLAND GOVERNMENT 2 (1991-92).
19. MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 9-101 to 9-502,8-1201 to 8-1211 (1990 & Supp.
1994).
20. MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 8-1204 (1990 & Supp. 1994).
21. MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 5-1601 to 5-1613 (Supp. 1994).
22. MD. CODE ANN., AGRIC. §§ 2-501 to 2-516 (1985 & Supp. 1994).
23. MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 8-1801 to 8-1816 (1990 & Supp. 1994); COMAR
§§ 14.15.01 to 14.15.07.
24. 2020 REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-15; Terry J. Harris, The Frightening Future
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To this end, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia formed the
Chesapeake Bay Commission to coordinate legislative planning and
programs to restore the Bay.2s On December 14, 1987, the Chesapeake
Bay Agreement was signed by representatives of the Chesapeake Bay
Commission, the District of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, and the United States Environmental Protection Agency.26
This Agreement commissioned a one year study to evaluate anticipated growth issues through the year 2020 and a distinguished panel
was assigned the task of developing strategies to alter traditional
growth patternsY
The Year 2020 Panel (the 2020 Panel) concluded that continuation of existing development patterns and unmanaged growth will
result in serious damage to the Bay unless bold measures are implemented. 28 The 2020 Panel devised six strategic policies which have
come to be known as the "Visions of 2020": (1) development is to
be concentrated in suitable areas; (2) sensitive areas are to be protected; (3) growth is to be directed to existing population centers in
rural areas, and resource areas are to be protected; (4) stewardship
of the Bay and the land is to be a universal ethic; (5) conservation
of resources is to be a regional priority; and (6) funding mechanisms
are to be in place to achieve all other visions. 29 The 2020 Panel
determined that these policies would be best achieved through a
of the Chesapeake Bay, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1991, at 08; Horton also offers
some comprehensive proposals:
For any widespread and sustained change in our land-use dilemma,
several things have to happen:
Some form of control or oversight must be instituted at a regional
or state level. States already have clear legal authority to do this, and
eight of them, including New Jersey, have now enacted some form
of comprehensive land-use law. We must be willing to put significant
portions of our agricultural and forest lands off limits to most
development-not just zone them for two-to-five acre residential lots.
As long as farmers can still farm, and timber companies can still cut
timber, this does not amount to an illegal "taking," as some propertyrights activists charge. If such land has already been subdivided and
approved for development, compensation might be called for. Developers have to be allowed much freer range to create livable, highdensity, mixed-use projects in areas where it makes sense for growth
to occur. This may prove more difficult than protecting open space,
since it is common for residents of towns to reject any proposals to
add density. All too often, sprawl happens because it is the path of
least resistance.
Horton, supra note II, at 24.
25. DIANE P. FRESE, ET AL., MARYLAND MANUAL, A GUIDE TO MARYLAND GovERNMENT 17 (1991-92).
26. [d.

27. 2020 REPORT, supra note 3, at 15.
28. [d. at I.
29. [d. at 4-8.
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regulatory system that includes state initiated land use policies and
standards that are applied to local governments in a mandatory
fashion and result in clearly defined areas designated for growth and
protection. 30 The 2020 Panel charged Maryland with the responsibility
for adopting a statewide comprehensive plan and developing criteria
to achieve consistency between the state plan and local actions. 3)
Thus began a three year struggle to define Maryland's role in a
planning and regulatory process traditionally operated by local governments. In late 1989, the Governor appointed a thirty-three member
commission responsible for evaluating the role of the state in directing
growth and development in a manner that will achieve the Visions
of 2020.32 The Barnes Commission 33 spent sixteen months conducting
evaluations of development strategies and holding public hearings
throughout Maryland. 34 Its report, published in January 1991, concluded that Maryland's population will increase by one million by
the year 2020, that sprawl development is a major contributing factor
in the loss of farms and forests and pollution of the Bay, and that
the threat of unmanaged growth to the Bay watershed is so substantial
that a statewide land use regulatory system is needed to successfully
implement the Visions of 2020. 35
The major elements of the Barnes Commission recommendations
were proposed by the Governor as administration bills during the
1991 session of the Maryland General Assembly. 36 These bills (the
2020 Bills) included the Visions of 2020 as the strategic policies of
the state,37 and proposed a system of mandatory local planning and
zoning to be implemented under a statewide land use classification
system 38 that divided local jurisdictions into four broad overlay zoning
districts: rural and resource areas, sensitive areas, developed areas,

30. [d. at 16-18.
31. [d. at 49-50.
32. Liz Bowie, Commission To Study Growth in Chesapeake Bay Region, THE
SUN (Balt.), Oct. 11, 1989, at 3D.
33. The Commission was nicknamed the Barnes Commission after its Chairman,
former United States Congressman from Montgomery County, ·Michael D.
Barnes.
34. MARYLAND OFFICE OF PLANNiNG, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, PLANNING WORKS 4
(1992) [hereinafter PLANNING WORKS).
35 .. See BAY REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-16.
36. Senate Bill 227, S. 227, 1991 Sess. (Md. 1991), and House Bill 214, H.D. 214,
1991 Sess. (Md. 1991), were introduced as administration bills by the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, respectively, on January 21, 1991,
and were quickly given the nickname "2020." M. Dion Thompson, County
Commissioners, Farmers Decry Chesapeake Bay Preservation Bill, THE SUN
(Bait.), Feb. 27, 1991, at 2C.
37. S. 227, 1991 Sess. (Md. 1991); H.D. 214, 1991 Sess. (Md. 1991).
38. S. 227, 1991 Sess. §§ 15-203, 15-207, 15-303 (Md. 1991).
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and areas suitable for growth. 39 Standards for sensitive areas were
included in the 2020 Bills,40 while standards for the other classifications were proposed for adoption by executive regulation. 41 The 2020
Bills required local governments to adopt plans and programs consistent with the land use classification system and the standards
proscribed for each zoning district. 42 Enforcement was keyed to a
state certification process and involved the Office of Planning in the
review and approval of local plans and programs. 43 A dispute resolution process was included to address conflicts over certification
decisions. 44 An infrastructure fund was proposed to finance· desired
levels of growth beyond the capacity of particular local governments
and fund allocations were to be determined by formula grants,45
measured by the wealth of local government,46 and incentive grants. 47
The proposed 2020 Bills introduced a major state presence into
a field that was all too frequently characterized by lax regulation
and parochialism.48 The 2020 Bills would replace a hodgepodge of
local regulations with consistent state policies and standards. 49 These
Bills followed the recommendations of the 2020 Panel,50 and a
growing trend of state regulatory initiatives adopted elsewhere 51 and
1994]

39. [d. §§ 15-203, 15-204.
40. Id. § 15-204.
41. [d. § 15-203. The Commission had initially proposed standards for legislative
consideration which were deleted from the Governor's bills. See id. §§ 15-204
to 15-206.
42. S. 227, 1991 Sess. § 15-206 (Md. 1991); H.D. 214, 1991 Sess. § 13-207 (Md.
1991).
43. S. 227, 1991 Sess. § 15-208 (Md. 1991).
44. [d. § 15-404.
45. [d. § 15-601(0.
46. [d. § 15-601(g).
47. [d. § 15-605.
48. See generally, Horton, supra note 11. The element of greed is also a factor
sometimes present in the land use regulatory process as illustrated by Maryland's
periodic history of political corruption by local zoning officials that prompted
the state legislature and the courts to adopt a number of reforms that include
among other requirements: open meetings, MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T §§
10-501 to 10-512 (1993 & Supp. 1994); public ethics and financial disclosure
requirements, MD. ANN. CODE art. 40A, §§ 1-101 to 7-104 (1993 & Supp.
1994); and adjudicatory safeguards, Hyson v. Montgomery County Council,
242 Md. 55, 217 A.2d 578 (1966); Ocean Hideaway Condominium Ass'n v.
Boardwalk Plaza Ventures, 68 Md. App. 650, 515 A.2d 485 (1986).
49. Shelly S. Wasserman, Managing 'Growth, MARYLAND B. J., Jan.-Feb. 1992, at
12, 13.
50. The 2020 Panel urged the adoption of state initiated policies and standards,
mandatorily imposed on local governments, and which clearly define growth
and protected areas. 2020 REPORT, supra note 3, at 16-17, 44-48. The 2020
Panel proposals satisfied all three objectives.
51. [d.; Wasserman, supra note 49, at 13-16.
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in Maryland under the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area ProgramY
The provisions for statewide standards and stringent state oversight were the most controversial parts of the 2020 Bills and eventually
led to their defeat. 53 The response to the Bills was swift and clamorous. Property rights advocates, developers, financial organizations,
farmers, the Maryland Municipal League, and the Maryland Association of Counties joined forces to form a solid and effective
opposition to the 2020 BillsY The Bills were defeated in committees
by lopsided margins;55 and the matter was referred to a summer
study committee of the General Assembly. 56
A compromise emerged from the 1991 summer study which
secured agreement on the Visions of 2020 as strategic state policy
and provided for the policy to be mandatory on local governments,
but retreated from state-initiated standards, oversight, and enforce. mentY The compromise left local goveniments with the sole responsibility to define growth and protected areas and develop
implementation measures to apply state policy. 58 The compromise
approach was enacted into law during the 1992 session. 59
52. This regional program of limited application employs state initiated policies
and standards that are mandatory for certain local governments. MD. CODE
ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 8-1801 to 8-1816 (1990 & Supp~ 1994); see Bellanca v.
Comm'rs of Kent County, 86 Md. App. 219, 586 A.2d 62, cert. denied, 323
Md. 33, 591 A.2d 249 (1991).
53. Howard Schneider, Maryland Assembly Kiffs Plan To Curb Growth; Environmentalists, Schaefer Rebuffed, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1991, at BI.
54. PLANNING WORKS, supra note 34, at 2; Howard Schneider, Views on Maryland
Growth Control Plan Range from 'Threat' to 'Vision', WASH. POST, Feb. 27,
1991, at 03; Roll, GrOWTh Biff Draws Fire from Builders, Farmers, MONTGOMERY JOURNAL, Feb. 27, 1991, at A5; M. Dion Thompson, CounTy Commissioners, Farmers Decry Chesapeake Bay Preservation Bill, THE SUN (Balt.),
Feb. 27, 1991, at 2C.
55. The Senate Bill failed on a vote of 10-1 in the Senate Economic and Environmental Matters Committee on March 14, 1991. The House of Delegates version
failed on a vote of 18-4 in the House Environmental Matters Committee on
the same day. C. Fraser Smith, 2020 Proposal To Govern Maryland GrOWTh
Put Off, Schaefer InitiaTive Rebuffed by HOllse, SenaTe Committees, THE SUN
(Bait.), Mar. 15, 1991, at AI.
56. The clamorous opposition to the 2020 proposals overshadowed strong support
from environmental groups which gave the legislature concern about an outright
rejection of the state regulatory concept. Consequently, the legislative leadership
pledged a comprehensive study during the summer of 1991 using the 2020
proposals as a starting poin t. Howard Schneider, Maryland Assembly Kills
Plan To Curb Growth; Environmentalists, Schaefer Rebuffed, WASH. POST,
Mar. 15, 1991, at BI.
57. James D. Lawler, Maryland: Growth Control Revisited, PLANNING (American
Planning Ass'n), Jan. 1992, at 5.
58. Id.
59. House Bill 1195, H.D. 1195,1992 Sess. (Md. 1992), was enacted by the General
Assembly of Maryland in 1992 as Section 2, Chapter 437, of the 1992 Laws
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This Article examines the new requirements of Maryland's law,
both the strengths and weaknesses, and proposes amendments necessary to fully achieve state policy. The new requirement for mandatory consistency between state policy and local actions and the
new authorization for use of flexible techniques to implement the
state policy will challenge both state and local governments to develop
innovative regulatory measures. Potential impediments to implementation of the state policy need to be overcome through careful
regulation and further legislation. The new law offers a modest
beginning in developing a process under which more sensible land
use patterns may emerge.
II.

THE PLANNING ACT REQUIREMENTS

The adoption of the Maryland Economic Growth, Resource
Protection, and Planning Act of 1992 (the Planning Act),60 resolved
the debate on what framework will be used to balance the sometimes
competing objectives of economic development, growth management,
and environmental protection. Both the 2020 Panel and the Barnes
Commission proposed a top-down approach where the state sets the
goals, program content, and standards that are implemented at the
local leve1. 61 The Planning Act adopted a bottom-up approach where
the program content, standards, and implementation are developed
at the local level subject to generalized state policy and state oversight
with respect to format and timing. The bottom-up approach represents a concession to the political aspects of the locally based planning
process and the difficulties of interfering with that process 62 and, like
many compromise measures, contains both strengths and weaknesses
with respect to its potential implementation.
The major strengths of the legislation include a new comprehensive growth policy, mandatory application of the policy on local
governments, a state oversight mechanism to monitor compliance, a
consistency requirement, and new authorization for use of flexible

of Maryland, 1992 Md. Laws § 2, ch. 437, now codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 66B (Supp. 1994), and MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. (Supp. 1994).
House Bill 457, H.D. 457, 1992 Sess. (Md. 1992), was enacted by the General
Assembly of Maryland in 1992 as Section 2, Chapter 436, of the 1992 Laws
of Maryland, 1992 Md. Laws § 2, ch. 436, now codified as MD. ANN. CODE
art. 66B § 10.01 (Supp. 1994).
60. H.D. 1195, 1992 Sess. (Md. 1992).
61. S. 227, 1991 Sess. (Md. 1991); H.D. 214, 1991 Sess. (Md. 1991); 2020 REPORT,
supra note 3, at 16-17. This approach follows the more successful state
programs. See DEGRovE, supra note 9, at 2-14.
62. Horton, supra note II, at 24.
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techniques. These last two implementation measures provide significant potential for successful application of state policy if properly
applied and, because of their significance, each measure is discussed
separately in Parts III and IV of this Article.
The Planning Act establishes strategic policies which collectively
constitute the state growth policy. This growth policy is designed to
promote the long-term environmental and economic health of the
region. 63 The new state growth policy largely incorporates the six
components of the Visions of 2020 and requires development to be
located in areas where it makes sense-where roads, schools, and
other public facilities and services already exist-and to avoid areas
where development would cause environmental harm.64 Specifically,
the new policy requires that local governments concentrate development in suitable areas 65 and protect sensitive,66 rural,67 and resource
areas. 68 The legislation also encourages economic development through
streamlined regulatory mechanisms,69 and calls for the removal of
administrative impediments in the development review process for
those areas designated as suitable for growth. 70 A provision for
affordable housing was also added as an element of state policy by
separate legislation. 71 The state growth policy represents a bold initiative designed to change the way land use is regulated at the local
level. The new policy seeks to eliminate sprawl development, the
most environmentally destructive form of development. 72 The success
of the policy, however, depends on the effectiveness of the implementation programs in applying the policy as it was intended.
The Planning Act provides a mandatory process under which
local governments adopt comprehensive plans 73 and modify local
regulations to be consistent with state policy. 74 Local governments
are also encouraged to use innovative and flexible techniques to
achieve state policy. 75 The Planning Act explicitly requires local
governments to protect sensitive areas. 76 All local comprehensive plans
63. MD. ANN. CODE art. 668, § 3.06 (Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN.
& PROC. § 5-7 A-O I (Supp. 1994).
64. Horton forcefully describes the need for the policy. Horton, supra note II, at
25.
65. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5-7A-OI(1) (Supp. 1994).
66. [d. § 5-7A-OI(2).
67. [d. § 5-7A-OI(3).
68. [d. § 5-7A-Ol(5).
69. [d. § 5-7A-OI(6).
70. MD. ANN. CODE art. 668, § 3.05(a)(l)(vi)(1) (Supp. 1994).
71. H.D. 457, 1992 Sess. (Md. 1992).
72. DEGRovE, supra note 9, at 9, 14, 34.
73. MD. ANN. CODE art. 668, § 3.06(b) (Supp. 1994).
74. [d. § 4.09.
75. [d. § 3 .05(a)(1 )(vi).
76. [d. § 3.06(b), (c).
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must include protection for streams' and stream buffers, IOO-year
floodplains, endangered species habitats, steep slopes, and other
sensitive areas that local governments may determine to be in need
of protection from adverse impacts of development. 77 Local plans
must also include recommendations to streamline the development
review process and to use flexible, innovative, and cost saving techniques that foster economic development. 78
By July 1, 1997, all local governments must adopt comprehensive
plans consistent with the state growth policy. 79 These local plans then
serve as the basis for all regulatory actions within each jurisdiction. 80
Zoning and subdivision regulations must be made consistent with the
plans,81 and therefore consistent with the state growth policy. Comprehensive zoning may be required to apply plan recommendations. 82
Presumably all comprehensive and piecemeal zoning map amendments, which form a part of the zoning regulations, must be consistent with both local plans and state policy. 83
Another important strength contained in the Planning Act is
state oversight in the form of a new state agency, the Economic
Growth, Resource Protection, and Planning Commission (the Commission), with responsibilities for monitoring, reviewing, and reporting on the performance of local governments. 84 The Commission

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. § 3.06(b).
Id. § 3.05(a)(l)(vi).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 3.05(b) (Supp. 1994).
Id. § 4.09.
Id.
Id.
Maryland follows the view that both comprehensive and piecemeal zoning are
legislative in nature and form an integral part of the local zoning regulations.
See Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 63, 217 A.2d 573,
583 (1966); Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 214 Md.
48, 66, 133 A.2d 83, 93 (1957) (Henderson, J., dissenting); see also Udell v.
Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 902 (N.Y. 1968).
84. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC., §§ 5-702, 5-708 (Supp. 1994). The
Commission, which was appointed in March, 1993, is composed of 17 members
serving two and four year terms. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at I. The
membership represents regions and interest groups from throughout the state.
MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5-703 (Supp. 1994). Two members
are appointed by the House and Senate and 15 members appointed by the
Governor from the following categories: two members representing the Maryland Associ,ation of Counties, one member re'presenting the Maryland Municipal
League, and ten members from seven specific regions of the state. Id. § 5-703.
The Governor is urged to select membership from business, finance, agriculture,
forestry, environmental, civic, planning, and real estate development interests.
Id. § 5-703(a)(3). The Commission must establish at least four subcommittees
the responsibilities and membership of which are mandated by statute. Id. §
5-707. The Committee on Interjurisdictional Coordination must promote coordination and cooperation among all jurisdictions consistent with the state
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must also formulate proposals for changes in the law as deemed
necessary to achieve the state growth policy, 8S assure that policy goals
are attained,86 protect sensitive areas,87 and assure that funding of
state and local infrastructure is consistent with local comprehensive
plans. s8 The Commission is also required to assess the progress of
local governments in the implementation of state policy. 89 The Com-

85.
86.
87.

88.
89.

growth policy and its initial membership must include five members recommended by the Maryland Association of Counties, three members recommended
by the Maryland Municipal League, two planners employed by local jurisdic·
tions, two citizens from different regions of the state, and one member selected
by the Commission chair. Id. The Committee on Planning must promote
education and outreach activities and its initial membership must include a
Commission member, two members of the local chapters of the American
Planning Association, two county officials one of whom is an elected official,
two municipal officials one of whom is elected, and four citizen members
selected by the Commission chair. [d. The Committee on Planning Techniques
must develop and promote the use of planning guidelines, models, examples,
and other planning tools needed to implement the state growth policy and local
plans and its initial membership must include one Commission member selected
by the Commission chair, two mem bers selected by the Maryland Association
of Counties, two members selected by the Maryland Municipal League, three
members selected by the Director, Office of State Planning, as representative
of private sector planning community, and two citizen members selected by
the Commission chair. [d. The Committee on the Environment and Economic
Development must promote balanced economic growth, effective protection of
the environment, and cooperation among environmental and development
interests and its initial membership must include one member of the Commission
selected by the Commission chair, six members selected by the Governor equally
representing environmental, business, local governments, and one member
representing agricultural interests. [d. A fifth Committee on Planning and
Zoning Review was appointed by the Commission and convened an organizational meeting on June 2, 1994, to examine the effectiveness of existing enabling
laws. Chairman Hutchinson Calls Another School Funding Commission Meeting, COURTHOUSE NEWS (Md. Ass'n of Counties, Annapolis, Md.), July 15,
1994, at 6.
The specificity of the Planning Act limits discretion in making appointments to the Commission and its Committees. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. &
PROC. § 5-707 (Supp. 1994); H.D. 1195, 1992 Sess. § 3 (Md. 1992). The
Committee membership is heavily weighted in favor of groups that played a
prominent role in opposing the earlier 2020 Panel proposals, particularly the
Maryland Association of Counties and the Maryland Municipal League. Anthony D. Redman, Maryland Growth Management Turnaround, PLANNING,
June, 1992, at 5. Nevertheless, the Committees are engaged in an ambitious
work program, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 6-32, and they enjoy wide
latitude to fashion workable and balanced methods for implementing the state's
growth policy. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5-707(a) (Supp. 1994).
Id. § 5-708(b)(2)(ii).
Id.
Id.
[d.
[d. § 5-708(a)(2).
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mISSIon has already made significant progress in developing models
and guidelines for use by local governments and has adopted a
comprehensive monitoring system with measurement criteria that will
show whether the state growth' policy is being effectively implemented. 90
The major weaknesses of the Planning Act involve the absence
of standards, incentives, direction, enforcement provisions, and a
dispute resolution process. The application of state policy depends
entirely upon the cooperation of local governments in applying the
state growth policy in good faith as part of their local comprehensive
plans. Yet, there is little in the way of policy direction, standards,
or incentives to guide local governments as to how the policy is to
be implemented. For example, the Planning Act does not define
significant terms such as "rural" or "growth" areas. Each jurisdiction can set its own growth boundaries without any clear differentiation separating growth areas from other areas. Baltimore County
considers "rural" in terms of a fifty acre minimum density. 91 Charles
County defines it as three acre density. 92 Washington County defines
it as one acre density.93 This absence of state-wide standards means
local governments have little incentive to curb sprawl development
which is the major objective of state policy. Rather, the perception
that "more high income residents are economically beneficial" will
likely perpetuate existing patterns of sprawl development 94 unless
incentives are devised and applied to the implementation process.
The Planning Act does not provide standards as to how sensitive
areas are to be defined. With the exception of 100 year floodplains,
local governments have wide discretion to define sensitive areas
differently. What is considered a steep slope in Montgomery County
may not be protected in neighboring Howard County, even though
the environmental impact of development is the same.
The Planning Act does not provide incentives for use of newly
authorized flexible techniques. These techniques would permit the
location of higher densities and different housing styles in communities designated as suitable for growth. These flexible techniques

90. The Commission measures progress based on II categories using a mixture of
empirical and anecdotal data. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 6-32. A useful
measurement is reflected in a series of Matrix charts, particularly the Matrix
on policy and the Matrix on consistency of regulations with policy. [d. at I,

7.
91. [d. at 7.
92. [d.
93. [d.

94. The validity of this perception is questioned earlier in this Article, see supra
note 15. The link between the perception and sprawl is discussed in DEGRovE,
supra note 9, at 9, 14, 34.
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would provide a key element for the effective implementation of
state policy, yet potential community opposition to their use may be
formidable and local governments are left without incentives or
guidance as to how and when the techniques should be applied. 95
The Commission's monitoring responsibilities are made difficult
by the absence of clear policy direction on how growth and protected
areas are to be defined. Indeed, the Commission recently acknowledged the need to define roles and responsibilities in order to properly
implement the Visions of 2020. 96 The Commission cannot monitor
compliance effectively when the baseline for any measurement of
compliance is undefined or defined differently by each local government who can pay lip service to the state policy by incorporating the
language of the Visions into their local plans and regulations and
yet fail to clearly define growth and protected areas.
Another weakness in the state oversight is the lack of enforcement provisions. Unlike the 2020 Panel proposals, the Planning Act
provides for only modest sanctions in the event of noncompliance. 97
State funding or support for state and local projects may be withheld
if the project is deemed inconsistent with the state growth policy.98
However, an exemption permits both the state and local governments
to avoid this sanction for extraordinary circumstances and where no
reasonable alternative exists. 99 Another sanction permits the Commission to adopt standards under limited circumstances. Failure to
adopt the sensitive area element of a local comprehensive plan by
July 1, 1998, will permit the Commission to adopt standards for
sensitive areas that are binding on local development until such time
as the local plan is brought into compliance.1°O Because local governments are given wide discretion to define sensitive areas and establish
standards for them, it is unlikely that these sanctions will ever be
levied.
The Commission is without clear authority to approve local
plans or programs and, other than for sensitive areas, adopt standards
with respect to state policy. This lack of enforcement authority may
undermine policy implementation. For example, protection of farmland is a major element of state policy, but implementation of the
policy is entirely a matter of local discretion both in terms of defining

95. Developed communities often provide the greatest opposition to new development. NAT. COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R.
Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 111, ch. I, at 206 [hereinafter
BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY]; Horton. supra note \1, at 24.
96. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 10.
97. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 5-709, 5-7A-02 (Supp. 1994).
98. {d. § 5-7A-02.
99. [d. §§ 5-7A-02(a)(2), (b)(2).
100. {d. § 5-709.
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protected areas, and adopting restrictive measures to insure preservation. Under the current framework, local neglect of state policy
can go unchallenged. The Commission needs authority to act when
local governments fail to implement state policy. Plan approval and
rule making authority would rectify situations where local governments fall short of adequate implementation. WI
Another necessary enforcement provision involves the right of
the state to intervene in cases where state policy issues are at stake.
Intervention is important because of the critical nature of state policy
and the serious consequences of nonenforcement. These enforcement
provisions can be effective without ever being invoked. For example,
designation of appropriate densities to adequately preserve farmland
may be a difficult task for local governments in the face of local
opposition. However, the mere possibility of the adoption of standards by the Commission or state intervention may prompt local
governments to take serious steps to implement state policy. Th~se
enforcement provisions would provide the Commission with authority
similar to that of the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Commission.102
The Planning Act fails to provide a dispute resolution process
for conflicts that will invariably arise. For example, there is no
process for determining consistency between the state growth policy
and local plans or regulations, although both the state and local
governments are required to adopt procedures for review of certain
affected projects.l 03 Presumably, decisions to withhold state funds or
other support will be based on initial state and local government
determinations of inconsistency. However, the Planning Act does not
provide criteria for making this determination or specify a forum
where disputes involving state and local governments, developers,
and other groups with legitimate concerns can be resolved.
Dispute resolution at the administrative level would reduce litigation and promote consistent application of state policy. Moreover,
an administrative process to resolve disputes seems a better alternative
,than case by case adjudication by the courts. An administrative
dispute resolution process should include the authority to establish
procedural rules governing access and scope of review as well as
substantive rules governing standards and criteria. The Commission
is the appropriate forum to hear and decide these disputes because
it will be developing an expertise pertaining to the state growth
policy.

Neces~ary elements of a successful state growth management program include
standards, criteria, and rules. See DEGROVE, supra note 9, at 4, 162-63; 2020
REPORT, supra note 3, at 16.
102. See MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 8-1806, 8-1809 (1990 & Supp. 1994).
103. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5-7A-02(c) (Supp. 1994).

101.
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The Planning Act establishes a new context for local planning
and land use regulation and represents a modest first step in providing
for more state involvement in this process. However, the goals of
state law far exceed the capacity of the administrative framework
designed to achieve them and, in this respect, the legislation is
incomplete. Greater policy direction, standards, incentives, enforcement provisions, and a dispute resolution process are needed to make
implementation effective. 104 The separate application of state policy
by each local government without some measure of cohesiveness and
a single dispute resolution process will undermine the integrity of the
policy and permit it to become a proverbial Tower of Babel. I05 the
Commission needs to be provided with the same authority currently
exercised by the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Commission. I06
Notwithstanding the incomplete nature of the legislation, its
bottom-up approach can be successful if a careful balance is struck
so that state policy is applied with enough flexibility to accommodate
local initiatives and regional differences, but with sufficient cohesiveness to retain its integrity and not to be sacrificed to either local
fragmentation or neglect. The challenge for the Commission will be
to encourage local governments to actually adopt plans and regulations that are truly consistent with the state growth policy lO7 and use
the flexible techniques now authorized to implement that. policy. 108
III.

THE CONSISTENCY REQUIREMENT

The state growth policy is made mandatory on local governments
through the consistency requirement which is simply stated but difficult to apply.I09 Regulatory actions must be consistent with goals
104. These elements are present in successful state programs and are recommended
by experts in the field as essential. See DEGROVE, supra note 9, at 10, 109.
105. See id.; Genesis II :5-9.
106. See MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 8-1801,8-1816 (1990 & Supp. 1994); North
v. St. Mary's County, 99 Md. App. 502, 638 A.2d 1175, cer!. denied, 336
Md. 224, 647 A.2d 444 (1994) (intervention authority); Bellanca v. County
Comm'rs of Kent County, 86 Md. App. 219, 586 A.2d 62, cer!. denied, 323
Md. 33, 591 A.2d 249 (1991) (state plan approval).
107. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, §§ 3.05(b), 3.06(b), 4.09 (Supp. 1994).
108. MD.. ANN. CODE art. 66B, §§ 10.01, 11.01, 12.01 (Supp. 1994).
109. The Commission summarized the problem nicely:
Attention to consistency arises from the fact that while no plan in
Maryland has ever advocated sprawl, this has been the result where
there is no strong connection between land use planning and land use
regulation. Well-drafted goals and policies have no meaning if they
are not supported by equally well-drafted zoning ordinances and
subdivision regulations. A working definition of consistency is difficult
to achieve, however. A literal translation of plan to regulation might
produce a situation where planners perform a function that is legis-
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and policies contained in the comprehensive plan. The problem lies
in the varied nature of comprehensive planning. Some plans contain
site specific recommendations, while others contain general recommendations with little concrete application to particular regulatory
actions. Moreover, planning and regulation serve different functions,
and the replication of the plan in regulation simply creates duplication
in process. A delicate balance is needed between the two functions
in order to maintain the integrity of one without replacement of the
other.
The planning process provides a sound basis for regulatory
action. Planning decisions are reached after careful study and public
debate on a range of issues affecting comprehensive areas. 11O These
planning decisions, which possess a degree of rationality generally
absent from ad hoc regulatory decisions, III are incorporated into a
comprehensive plan, master plan, or general plan. 1I2 Under the consistency requirement, these plans serve as the basis for subsequent
regulatory decisions. 113 The consistency requirement promotes the
goals of comprehensive planning and links planning and development
regulations so these regulations, and decisions made pursuant to
them, are evaluated against a planning baseline." 4
The consistency requirement is not new and was explained in
Fasano v. Board of Commissioners,"5 a famous Oregon case which
held that zoning decisions must ·be consistent with land use and
density elements of the comprehensive plan. 1I6 Since Oregon has used
the consistency requirement longer than any other jurisdiction, its
case law provides some useful insights into how consistency is applied.
A consistency determination involves all elements of a comprehensive
plan.1I7 For example, a zoning request that was not consistent with
the plan's staging element was found to lack consistency."8 In another

lative in nature, or a situation where both documents are so similar
it is not necessary to have both.
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 15. The Subcommittee on Planning Techniques is drafting an "operational" definition of consistency. [d.
110. See generally Mraz v. Comm'rs of Cecil County, 291 Md. 81, 433 A.2d 771
(1981).
Ill. See DEGRovE, supra note 9, at 15,21.
112. The terms "comprehensive plan," "master plan," and "general plan" are
interchangeable. MD. ANN. CODE art. 668, § l.OO(f)(2) (Supp. 1994).
113. MD. ANN. CODE art. 668, § 4.09 (Supp. 1994).
114. 1 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF's THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING
§ 12.04[2) (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter RATHKOPF); see DEGROVE, supra note 9,
at IS, 21.
115.507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973).
116. [d. at 29-30.
117. [d. at 28.
118. Philipi v. City of Sublimity, 662 P.2d 325, 329 (Or. 1983).
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case, a zoning request for greater intensity of use than contemplated
by the plan was found to be inconsistent with the plan. 119
The consistency requirement as applied to zoning regulations will
present a major surprise for many because of the long-standing
Maryland common-law rule that master plans are only guides and
cannot form the basis for zoning decisions. 120 This common-law rule,
of course, only applies in the absence of statute l21 and the courts
have recognized that local efforts to link planning and zoning actions
by statute are appropriate and elevate the status of comprehensive
plans to a regulatory device. 122
Consistency was applied in Maryland in several cases. In County
Commissioners v. Gaster,123 consistency between the master plan and
subdivision approval was required by statute. 124 A denial of a sub-

119. Gillis v. City of Springfield, 611 P .2d 355, 356-57 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
120. See STANLEY D. ABRAMS, GUIDE TO MARYLAND ZONING DECISIONS § 5.2 (3d
ed. 1992). The common-law rule is not unique to Maryland and developed at
a time when local governments struggled with the implementation of their
newly delegated land use authority. See generally Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955). The term
"comprehensive plan" has been a part of zoning enabling laws since the 1920s.
Id. at 1154. The plan was intended to provide a link between planning and
zoning actions and the enabling laws provided that zoning be "in accord with
the comprehensive plan." Id. When zoning was first applied at the local level,
however, many jurisdictions neglected to adopt comprehensive plans as the
term is now understood and this omission caused problems for reviewing courts
when the zoning was challenged. Id.
At one time, the term "comprehensive plan" was undefined which allowed
judges to define the plan as something other than a physical document. Hence,
some courts defined the "comprehensive plan" as the cumulative product of
corriprehensive zoning regulations, administrative practice, and local custom.
See Nottingham Village, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 266 Md. 339, 292 A.2d
680 (1972); Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 214 Md ..
48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957); Udall v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1968). On this
basis the comprehensive plan was defined as something different than a master
plan. The result of these decisions rendered master plans mere guides that were
not to playa significant role in the regulatory process. Kanfer v. Montgomery
County Council, 35 Md .. App. 715, 373 A.2d 5 (1977). Since comprehensive
plans are now defined by law to include master plans and general plans, MD.
ANN. CODE art.' 66B, § 1.00 (Supp. 1994), it is unlikely that the common-law
rule will hinder the implementation of the consistency requirement of the
Planning Act.
121. Boyds Civic Ass'n v. Montgomery County Council, 309 Md. 683, 702-04, 526
A.2d 598, 608-09 (1987); Floyd v. Council of Prince George's County, 55 Md.
App. 246, 258-59, 461 A.2d 76, 83 (1983).
122. Boyds Civic Ass'n, 309 Md. at 702-04, 526 A.2d at 608-09; Floyd, 55 Md.
App. at 258-59, 461 A.2d at 83.
123. 285 Md. 233,401 A.2d 666 (1979).
124. Id. at 242, 401 A.2d at 670.
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division approval based on a finding of inconsistency with the plan
was upheld despite conformity with the applicable zoning. 125 The
master plan contained a staging element that limited density to·
adequate roads and the development was denied on that basis.126 The
Gaster decision was followed in Coffey v. Maryland-National Capital
Park & Planning Commission. 127 Several local governments have
linked planning and zoning by a statutory consistency requirement l28
and the validity of this approach was acknowledged in Boyds Civic
Association v. Montgomery County Council.129
The Commission identified several factors for use in evaluating
consistency with the state growth policy: (1) creating opportunities
for concentrated development in suitable plan-designated areas; (2)
achieving regulatory streamlining to encourage development and economic growth in plan-designated areas; (3) implementing protection
for agricultural land and other rural resource areas; and (4) requiring
that sensitive areas be adequately delineated in the plan or mapped
by an applicant. 130 The Commission's actual evaluations, however,
appear nonsubstantive in nature and may permit consistency determinations where local jurisdictions simply articulate the state policy
without meaningful regulations to implement it. For example, rural
zoning categories in several counties are listed by the Commission as
apparently consistent with state policy when they reflect density levels
that encourage the continuation of sprawl development and do not
preserve agricultural land. 131
Consistency is critical to the success of the state policy and
disputes will invariably arise as to its implementation. For example,
any authorization for development within an area in need of protection is likely to prompt a challenge based on consistency. Local
regulatory decisions may raise questions of consistency with state
policy and policies adopted by neighboring jurisdictions. 132 Municipal

125.
126.
127.
128.

129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id. at 240-41, 401 A.2d at 669-70.
293 Md. 24, 25-26, 441 A.2d 1041, 1041-42 (1982).
For example, Montgomery and Prince George's Counties established several
zoning districts that require consistency with the master plan. See MONTGOMERY
COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCE §§ 59-C-6.214, 59-C-8.24, 59-C-12.2, 59-C-18.3
(Jan. 1993); Floyd v. Council of Prince George's County, 55 Md. App. 246,
461 A.2d 76 (1983).
309 Md. 683, 526 A.2d 675 (1989).
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 16.
Id. at 7.
Developments with regional impact need to be evaluated on a comprehensive
basis. The potential environmental impact of the Washington Redskins professional football stadium proposed to be located near the juncture of three
counties has prompted local governments and environmental groups to complain
about the lack of a regional dispute resolution forum. Dan Beyers, Two
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annexation of land within a county's protected areas can also raise
questions of consistency with both local plans and state policy. m
There is a need to provide a mechanism to resolve these potential
disputes. 134 The absence of a dispute resolution process means that
local governments will make the initial determination themselves and,
if disputes arise, the courts will decide whether local plans, regulations, or decisions are consistent with the state growth policy or with
each other. It remains to be seen how the consistency requirement
will be applied, but the current law encourages both lawyer ingenuity
and litigation. 135

Leading Environmental Groups Formally Oppose Laurel Stadium Plan, WASH.
POST, July 14, 1994, at B3. After a record 27 days of public hearings reflecting
significant controversy, local land use approval of the proposed development
will be made under Anne Arundel County's special exception process. Dan
Beyers, Stadium Middleman Keeping His Balance, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1994,
at B6.
133. For example, Poolesville, a Montgomery County municipality which possesses
its own planning and zoning powers, is considering annexation of a large tract
currently designated as part of the county's agricultural preserve for use as a
large school and religious complex sponsored by the Saudi Arabian government.
The project which was described by county officials as a mega city is considered
inconsistent with county planning objectives. Louis Aquilar, Potter Joins
Opposition to Saudi Project in Poolesville, WASH. POST, Sept. I, 1994, at Md.
I. In recognition of the annexation problem, the Commission recommended
that it undertake a study of annexation laws and policies with the objective to
better define long-term growth boundaries. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at

4.
134. The Planning Act requires procedures to be adopted for determining consistency
with respect to state funding and support sanctions, but these procedures will
necessarily be narrow in scope applying only to certain projects and will not
address local plans or land use regulations. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. &
PROC. § 5-7A-02(c) (Supp. 1994). The Planning Act also requires state agencies
to coordinate their actions and policies so they are consistent with the state
growth policy and local plans. [d. § 5-7 A-02. The Planning Act requires state
government projects and funding to conform with the planning initiatives. ld.
State actions, for the first time, must be consistent with not only the state
growth policy but also with local plans which apply that policy. [d. State
procedures were adopted to review capital projects for consistency. ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 5, at 30. This aspect of the Planning Act is significant
because growth policies adopted by other states have been undermined by the
failure to include state agencies and their projects in the policy implementation.
See DEGRovE, supra note 9, at 26-27.
135. Judicial resolution of consistency disputes raises questions about standing. A
developer denied permission to build may challenge a consistency determination.
A local government denied state funding may also challenge a consistency
determination. However, environmental or civic groups may not enjoy equal
rights to question local consistency determinations because of common-law
standing restrictions. See Medical Waste Assocs. v. Maryland Waste Coalition,
327 Md. 596, 612-14, 612 A.2d 241, 245-50 (1992). Neighboring jurisdictions
also need access to a forum to argue their disagreements with local plans, as
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The task of evaluating local plans or regulations for their consistency with the state policy and with each other may overwhelm an
overworked judicial system in view of the wide variation among local
comprehensive plans, regulations, and decisions that will be produced
under the current framework. A judicial determination of noncompliance with the consistency requirement may cause invalidation of
a whole planning and zoning scheme. Given the importance of
consistency in the implementation of the state policy, invalidation
may be a necessary remedy in certain circumstances.'36 However, the
sanction raises questions about interim regulations which will govern
in the absence of invalidated regulations. Will the Commission be
permitted to adopt interim regulations as it is authorized to do in
the case of sensitive area matters?137 Will the courts require other
interim relief; and, if so, what relief? These questions underscore the
incomplete nature of the legislation and provide another justification
for a dispute resolution mechanism.
The manner in which the consistency requirement is applied will
determine the credibility of the current legislative approachYs If local
comprehensive plans are truly consistent with the state policy and
this consistency is enforced through adoption of land use regulations
and development approvals, then major strides in the implementation
of state policy will be achieved. If, however, local governments are
allowed to conduct business as usual, then state policy will lose
credibility and the environment will continue to suffer the consequences.
IV.

FLEXIBLE TECHNIQUES

The Planning Act encourages use of innovative and flexible
techniques by local governments for implementation of the state
growth policy. 139 Local governments are authorized to employ a
variety of flexible techniques for managing growth under several

136.
137.

138.
139.

illustrated by a recent conflict about potential development in Howard County
and objections by neighboring Montgomery and Prince George's Counties.
Dan Beyers, Howard's Development Aspirations Fracture Tri-County Cordiality, WASH. POST, March 30, 1993, at B I. I f appeals can only be made by those
regulated and not the beneficiaries of the regulation, the state policy will be
frustrated. Fairness supports wide access to a comprehensive dispute resolution
forum on the question of consistency.
Invalidation may be applied as a remedy where local action departs from
established norms. City of Miami v. Save Bricknell Ave., Inc., 426 So. 2d
1100, 1102 (Fla. App. 1983).
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5-709 (Supp. 1994).
Effective state oversight requires empowerment to resolve the inevitable conflicts
that will arise over interpretation of state policy. DEGRoVE, supra note 9, at
162-63.
.
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 3.05(a)(l)(vi) (Supp. 1994).
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provisions of state lawl40 and these techniques have been applied with
some success by local governments in Maryland and elsewhere. 141
The core of the state growth policy can be distilled into four
regulatory objectives: (1) growth concentrated in suitable areas under
streamlined procedures; 142 (2) provision for affordable housing; 143 (3)
resource conservation 144 and protection of sensitive areas; 145 and (4)
funding mechanisms that achieve the other strategic policies. 146 This
Part of this Article analyzes how flexible techniques may be used
either individually or in combination for the implementation of these
four objectives. Of course, individual techniques may be applied to
several objectives and this analysis does not suggest that the techniques can only be applied as discussed.

A. Growth Concentrated in Suitable Areas Under Streamlined
Procedures
The principal regulatory technique for directing growth to desired
locations is zoning because it determines land use, density, and
location. Zoning can be either a streamlined device or an obstacle
to growth.l 47
1.

Types of Zoning Available in Maryland

Traditional Euclidean zoning is the most prevalent form of
zoning,148 and it constitutes the biggest obstacle for implementation
of state policy. Euclidean zoning is designed as a rigid, self-executing
regulation, that requires minimum government oversight once implemented. 149 Design standards are applied in an inflexible manner, 150
except for a cumbersome and sometimes strict variance process that
140. [d. §§ 10.01, 11.01, 12.01 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
141. See Carol M. Dickey, History of Staging in Montgomery County, 1993 J. OF
MD. PLANNING, at 1-6; DEGRovE, supra note 9, at 90; RATHKOPF, supra note
114, §§ 9.01-9.02, 9.04.
142. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5-7A-0I(l) (Supp. 1994); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 66B, § 3.05(a)(I)(vi) (Supp. 1994).
143. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, §§ 10.01, 12.Q1 (Supp. 1994).
144. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5-7A-01(5) (Supp. 1994).
145. [d. § 5-7A-01(2).
·146. [d. § 5-7A-01(7).
147. Zoning has historically manifested both results. Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Shaping

Megalopolis: The Transformation of Euclidean Zoning by Special Zoning
Districts and Site Specific Development Review Techniques, 1993 ZONING AND
PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK, at 65-79; BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra
note 95, at 203-08.
148. Euclidean zoning derives its name from the basic zoning ordinance upheld in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
149. BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 95, at 203-04.
150. [d.

1994]

Maryland's Growth Policy

483

may provide a waiver in cases of hardship or practica1 difficulty. 151
In practice, Euclidean zoning is not conducive to either concentration
of growth or streamlined regulation. It has been historically applied
with a "wait and see" attitude to zone large areas for low densities
that are suitable for higher density development, allowing local
officials to negotiate higher densities as development proposals materialize. ls2 Paradoxically, it has also been applied in a lax manner
to zone areas for residential use that should be protected because of
their rural or sensitive nature, but become ripe for development
before local government can act to adopt protective measures. 153 Once
applied, revisions are difficult, expensive, and time consuming. 154

151. North v. St. Mary's County, 99 Md. App. 502, 511, 638 A.2d 1175, 1179
(1994). The late Judge Rita C. Davidson provided a thorough explanation of
the variance process as applied in Maryland in Anderson v. Board of Appeals,
22 Md. App. 28, 39, 322 A.2d 220, 226-27 (1974).
152. Kaplan, supra note 17, at 26-31; BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note
95, at 206.
153. 2020 REPORT, supra note 3, at 18-19; BAY REPORT, supra note 1, at 7; Horton,
supra note 11, at 25; ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 15.
154. Euclidean rezoning is very difficult to change. In Maryland, Euclidean zoning
amendments are subject to the change-mistake rule which requires a strict
standard of proof. See ABRAMS, supra note 120, § 1.3. Maryland's changemistake rule is a judicially created doctrine that supposedly has its roots in
Northwest Merchant Terminal, Inc. v. O'Rourke, 191 Md. 171, 60 A.2d 743
(1948). The essential elements are simply stated: "Where a property is rezoned,
it must appear that either there was some mistake in the original (or subsequent
comprehensive) zoning, or the character of the neighborhood has changed to
such an extent that such action ought to be taken." Kracke v. Weinberg, 197
Md. 339, 347, 79 A.2d 387,391 (1951).
The purpose of the change-mistake rule is to provide a baseline measurement to evaluate the continuing validity of a presumption accorded the last
comprehensive zoning. Comprehensive zoning is by definition the product of
a well thought out, carefully planned zoning action that considers a number
of policies, premises, assumptions, and trends, and it is normally accorded a
presumption of validity as a safeguard against later attempts to rezone individual parcels in a haphazard manner that threatens the underlying public
policies of the comprehensive zoning. Mraz v. Board of County Comm'rs, 291
Md. 81, 88-89, 433 A.2d 771, 776 (1981); see Norbeck Village Joint Venture
v. Montgomery County Council, 254 Md. 59, 66, 254 A.2d 700, 705 (1969).
If the presumption is overcome, then individual rezoning is deemed permissible.
Howard County v. Dorsey, 292 Md. 351, 355, 438 A.2d 1339, 1342 (1982).
The change-mistake rule applies to piecemeal Euclidean rezoning, see
Mayor of Baltimore v. NAACP, 221 Md. 329, 334, 157 A.2d 433, 436 (1960),
and does not apply to comprehensive zoning, McBee v. Baltimore County, 221
Md. 312, 317, 157 A.2d 258, 260 (1960), or to floating zones, Huff v. Board
of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 214 Md. 48, 61, 133 A.2d 83, 91
(1957). Defining the circumstances that satisfy the rule can cause considerable
delay and expense because of the complex factual and legal issues concerning
what constitutes change, mistake, or the neighborhood. See generally ABRAMS,
supra note 120, ch. 1. The rule has been widely criticized as overly restrictive
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Euclidean zoning is responsible for most of the sprawl development
against which the Visions of 2020 are directed. 155
The floating zone, by contrast, provides an important tool for
application of flexible techniques because its provisions can be tailored to site specific land uses, as well as performance and design
objectives. 156 It forms the host for a variety of flexible zoning
districts. 157 Moreover, it can be applied more quickly and easier than
Euclidean zoning and therefore responds better to market forces and
provides for more streamlined regulation. 158 For these very reasons,

155.
156.

157.

158.

and inflexible. See I NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW
§ 32.01 (1988).
The rigid nature of the Euclidean zoning means that the use of flexible
zoning techniques are largely confined to floating zones or comprehensive
:loning. Yet, floating zones are disfavored in some jurisdictions because of
hostility from the community about their sudden application. Comprehensive
zoning does not permit a site specific analysis that is inherent in the use of
flexible zoning. Because of these limitations, a broader baseline should be
applied for more flexible use of Euclidean zoning. The change-mistake rule
need not be abandoned. It has served the state well. What is proposed, however,
is that the enabling law be amended to permit rezoning to be granted on the
basis of other factors in addition to change-mistake. See Fasano v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 28-29 (Or. 1979), overruled on other grounds
by 607 P.2d 725 (Or. 1980).
BAY REPORT, supra note I, at 7; ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 15.
The floating zone derives its name from its unanchored characteristic that
permits it to float over an entire legislative district and descend at any location
that satisfies predetermined standards. See generally Huff v. Board of Zoning
Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 133 A.2d 8 (1957). The "floating zone" is now authorized
for use by all jurisdictions in Maryland with planning and zoning authority.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 1O.01(a)(8) (Supp. 1994). The annotation for this
section provides a useful working definition of the term floating zone. The
authorization of floating zones for all jurisdictions with planning and zoning
authority is important because it corrects an inconsistency among the various
jurisdictions and promotes the use of site specific flexible zoning techniques.
Nevertheless, further clarification is necessary. Noncharter counties and municipalities are governed by the enabling authority found in Article 66B, MD.
ANN. CODE art. 668, § 4.05(a) (1988 & Supp. 1994), that requires findings of
fact relating to change and mistake that are inappropriate for floating zones.
See Aubinoe v. Lewis, 250 Md. 645, 653, 244 A.2d 879, 883-84 (1968).
Flexibility in application, as compared to the rigidity of the Euclidean zones,
is a major advantage for the floating zone. Ziegler, supra note 147. The
floating zone has been compared to a special exception that can be applied at
any location within a specified zoning district that satisfies predetermined
legislative standards. Compare Bigenho v. Montgomery County Council, 248
Md. 386, 390-91, 237 A.2d 53, 56 (1968) with Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. I,
11,432 A.2d 1319,1325 (1981). The analogy stops at this point because the
floating zone is applied over a wider area and involves legislative discretion
rather than a purely administrative action. Rockville Crushed Stone, Inc. v.
Montgomery County, 78 Md. App. 176, 183, 552 A.2d 960, 963 (1989).
The change-mistake rule does not apply to floating zones, Aubinoe v. Lewis,
250 Md. 645, 652, 244 A.2d 879, 883 (1968), so the zoning can be applied
quickly if the location meets the eligibility requirements.
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however, the floating zone is viewed with suspicion by community
groups and political pressure often discourages its use. 159 The rigid
nature of the Euclidean zone presents few surprises for the community, but the floating zone can be applied suddenly and without
warning. 160 The flexibility of the floating zone is achieved at the
expense of predictability. It is necessary, therefore, to use floating
zones with adequate safeguards to insure both compatibility and
predictability. 161
A hybrid or special purpose zoning device combines the certainty
of Euclidean zoning with the flexibility of the floating zone. This
hybrid zoning device was approved in Maryland in Montgomery
County V. Woodward & Lothrop,162 and provides for both standard
and optional methods of development within a base Euclidean zone. 163
The optional method usually includes incentives, such as higher
densities and preferred uses, to encourage its application,164 but also
requires more government oversight through a site plan review process
to ensure compatibility and necessary amenities. 165 This hybrid zoning
involves a delegation of authority to an administrative agency that
approves site plans under pre-set legislative standards.'66 The zoning
authority has less control under this hybrid than it does under the
floating zone,167 but the hybrid offers the community more predictability. 168

159. See supra note II. The community opposition to more density is characterized
as NIMBYism or "not in my back yard." Wasserman, supra note 49, at 13.
The purpose of zoning at the community level is to protect established neighborhoods from the intrusion of incompatible uses. Much local zoning is
intended more to prevent change than to guide it. BUILDING THE AMERICAN
CITY, supra note 95, at 204.
160. The floating zoning cannot be applied without satisfying procedural notice
requirements. However, it can be applied without the delays and expense
associated with the Euclidean zone. See supra note 154.
161. See infra Part IV.A.2.
162. 280 Md. 686, 725, 376 A.2d 483, 504 (1977).
163. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE § 59-C-6.215 (1994).
164.
165.
166.
167.

[d.
Ziegler, supra note 147.
[d. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE § 59-D-2.0 (1994).
The zoning authority exercises legislative discretion when considering the application of a floating zone, but the discretion is diminished when an administrative agency is delegated the decision making role under pre-set standards.
Compare Rockville Crushed Stone, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 78 Md. App.
176, 193-94, 552 A.2d 960, 968 (1989) with Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1,21,
432 A.2d 1319, 1330 (1981).
168. The Euclidean base zone will normally be applied by comprehensive zoning.
See Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686, 376
A.2d 483 (1977).
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Another hybrid device is the overlay zoning district, which, as
its name implies, involves the application of a second layer of zoning
to achieve a specific purpose without replacing the base zone. 169 This
hybrid zoning was approved in Maryland in Swarthmore Co. v.
Kaestner,170 and may be more restrictive than the base zoning for
environmental protection purposes in areas where base zoning is
already applied, but does not contain adequate safeguards to protect
the environment. 171 The overlay zone can also be used to achieve
flexibility in the authorization of development that could not occur
under the base zoning. For example, Montgomery County adopted
an overlay zoning district to maintain the scale and character of the
Wheaton Central Business District, and yet permit a range of retail,
cultural, entertainment, and recreational uses not permitted under
the base zoning.172
Both the floating zone and the hybrids can serve as hosts for
the various flexible techniques now authorized for local governments.
These zoning tools are used to concentrate growth in suitable locations under a streamlined regulatory process.
2.

Use of Flexible Techniques

Flexible zoning techniques can accommodate immediate development or growth staged over time and provide for a varied mix of
housing types and densities, more efficient use of land, environmentally sensitive development, more open space, and a range of community amenities.173 Several flexible zoning techniques, including the
following, can be used in combination to promote these objectives:
the cluster method of development,174 mixed use development, 175
RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 1.04(2)[L].
258 Md. 517, 266 A.2d 341 (1970).
RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 7.03[3]; Ziegler, supra note 147.
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE § 59-C-18 (1994).
173. See Estate of Friedman v. Pierce County, 768 P.2d 462, 469 (Wash. 1989);
Orinda Homeowners Comm. v. Board of Supervisors, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88, 90
(1970).
174. Cluster development authorizes variations in the manner of development in
order to preserve open spaces and environmentally sensitive areas. See Estate
of Friedman v. Pierce County, 768 P.2d 462 (Wash. 1989). Cluster development
is often permitted as an alternative form of development at the subdivision
stage or as a flexible zoning device. The annotation to subsection 10.0\ (a)(5)
of Article 66B, MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 1O.01(a)(5) (Supp. 1994), provides
a useful working definition of this term.
175. Mixed use development allows for a combination of uses within the same
zoning district. See Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280
Md. 686, 694-95, 376 A.2d 483, 488 (1977). Because zoning was originally
justified on the basis that separation of uses accomplished important public
purposes, see Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391

169.
170.
171.
172.
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planned unit development (PUD),176 performance zoning,l77 and incentive zoning. 178
The discretion associated with flexible zoning demands government oversight throughout the development process because the greater

(1926), care must be taken to ensure that this zoning device maintains necessary
elements of compatibility in its application so that the mixed uses are not
vulnerable to a charge of arbitrary classifications. See Goldman v. Crowther,
147 Md. 282, 128 A. 50 (1925). This device is always dependent on a site
specific plan because the specific mix of uses must be authorized by the zoning
authority or under delegated standards to an administrative agency. If the mix
of uses is approved at the zoning stage, it is usually applied as piecemeal
rezoning to allow for a site specific evaluation. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 668,
§ 1O.01(a)(4) (Supp. 1994) (annotation providing working definition of "mixed
use development").
176. The PUD is another site specific zoning device that can include both cluster
and mixed use development. See Estate of Friedman v. Pierce County, 768
P.2d 462, 469 (Wash. 1989). It is often established as a floating zone, the
location of which is evaluated under pre-set legislative standards and a site
specific development plan approved at the time of zoning. Although PUDs
have been widely used in Maryland, review by the courts has been limited. See
Coscan Washington, Inc. v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning
Comm'n, 87 Md. App. 602, 590 A.2d 1080 (1991), cert. denied 324 Md. 324,
597 A.2d 421 (1991); Rockville Crushed Stone, Inc. v. Montgomery County,
78 Md. App. 176, 552 A.2d 960 (1989); Montgomery County v. Greater
Colesville Citizens Ass'n, 70 Md. App. 374, 521 A.2d 770 (1987); see also
Floyd v. County Council, 55 Md. App. 246, 461 A.2d 76 (1983); Howard
Research & Dev. Corp. v. Howard County, 46 Md. App. 498, 418 A.2d 1253
(1980). See MD. ANN. CODE art. 668, § 1O.01(a)(6) (Supp. 1994) (annotation
providing working definition of "planned unit development").
177. Performance zoning relies more on performance standards than the more
traditional design standards. The zoning can be used to measure external
impacts for environmental protection and other purposes. See RATHKOPF, supra
note 114, § 1.04[2][m]. For example, Columbia's New Town Zoning District
requires development to provide certain levels of green space and density but
within these limitations, the developer retains flexibility over design and bulk
issues. HOWARD COUNTY, MD., ZONING REGULATIONS § 122A (1985); see MD.
ANN. CODE art. 668, § 1O.01(a)(IO) (Supp. 1994) (annotation providing working
definition of "performance zoning").
178. Incentive zoning provides inducements, usually in the form of higher densities,
in exchange for public facilities or amenities ranging from public space to
affordable housing. RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 1.04[2Hi]. Incentive zoning
is a sophisticated level of regulation that includes several levels of government
oversight to insure that the incentives are property implemented in a manner
that achieves the objectives of the zoning. See generally Jerold S. Kayden,

Zoning jor Dollars: New Rules jar an Old Game? Comments on the Municipal
Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1991).
A site specific plan is reviewed and approved either at the zoning stage, the
subdivision or permit stage, or both. The zoning can be designed on two levels
to include the incentive and a base zone that allows development as of right
without the incentive. [d.; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 668, § 1O.01(a)(9) (Supp.
1994) (annotation providing working definition of "incentive zoning").
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flexibility and discretion of the process means greater potential for
abuse. 179 Government oversight must ensure procedural fairness and
prevent abuse of discretion. 180 Safeguards include pre-set design 181 or
performance standards,182 development plan 183 or site plan reviews,184
master plan conformity, 185 amendment procedures,186 provisions for

179. Kayden, supra note 178, at 6-7; RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 41.06.
180. See generally 3 RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 41.06.
181. Pre-set standards can include minimum and maximum levels of development.
An approved development may exceed threshold standards in order to justify
the zoning at a particular location. For example, a proposal may include 451170
open space even though the minimum standard is only 30%. The additional
open space may be necessary to achieve desired clustering or environmental
objectives. These pre-set standards are necessary to ensure that development
does not violate traditional prohibitions against conditional zoning. See Montgomery County v. Greater Colesville Citizens Ass'n, Inc., 70 Md. App. 374,
385, 521 A.2d 770, 776 (1987); cf. Rodriguez v. Prince George's County, 79
Md. App. 537, 551-52, 558 A.2d 742, 749 (1989).
182. RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 1.04[2][m]. For example, minimum noise levels
may be required for industrial uses. See MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., ZONING
ORDINANCE § 59-C-12 (1993).
183. A development plan is approved at the time of zoning and, in the absence of
pre-set standards, provides the key limitation under the flexible zoning technique
because it contains authorization for specific land uses, densities, and bulk
specifications such as setbacks and building heights. 2 ROBERT M. ANDERSON,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 11.12 (3d ed., 1986 & Supp. 1992); Millbrae
Ass'n for Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae, 69 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1968).
The plan includes the zoning specifications as applied to the site. [d. All parcels
included under a development plan are subject to it despite a subsequent
conveyance. The conveyed parcel is not severed from the development plan
unless the plan is specifically amended. Estate of Friedman, 768 P.2d at 469.
184. Site plan review provides for post-zoning oversight to ensure conformity with
pre-set standards or a development plan. Millbrae Ass'n, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 26465. Site plan review is limited in scope under delegated administrative authority.
S.E.W. Friel v. Triangle Oil Co., 76 Md. App. 96, 109, 543 A.2d 863, 869
(1988). It is not intended as a substitute for zoning. [d. at 106, 543 A.2d at
868. Consequently, a planning board lacks authority to approve a site plan
that purports to change land uses, density, development standards, or staging
of development. Hansel v. City of Keene, 634 A.2d 1351, 1353 (N.H. 1993).
185. Master plan conformity plays a growing role in the use of flexible zoning. See
supra Part III. The' master plan is used to set limits on density, provide
development guidelines for certain locations, specify land uses or environmental
requirements, provide for staging of development until public facilities are
adequate, and specify the need for public facilities or amenities such as local
parks or open space. See generally supra Part lIl.
186. Amendment procedures provide opportunity for changes to be considered. Not
every change to an approved flexible zoning project requires a hearing. See
generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (discussing due process
requirements); Cloutier v. Town of Epping, 714 F.2d 1184, 1191 (1st Cir.
1983); Chevy Chase Village v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 249 Md.
334, 345-46, 339 A.2d 740, 745 (1968). There is a need to structure the
amendment process so that it achieves both streamlined objectives and fairness
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perpetual maintenance of common areas,187 and development agreements for public facilities or amenities. 188 Each of these measures
plays an important role in ensuring that flexible zoning is properly
applied and implemented in an integrated and consistent manner.
Safeguards are also necessary to assuage community hostility to
flexible zoning.
Design flexibility is a prominent characteristic of this type of
zoning. 189 Instead of rigid standards characteristic of traditional Euclidean zoning,l90 flexible zoning permits unique forms of development tailored to site specific situations. 191 The site specific evaluation
promotes better development because land uses, design, and location
can be evaluated under a discretionary process that allows flexibility
for the developer in exchange for more detailed regulation. 192
An example of the flexible zoning process can be found in the
Town of Columbia, Maryland, that was developed under techniques

to the participants.
An obvious demarcation in the formality of the process would involve
changes that affect approved density, land use, or bulk specifications such as
building height. These elements are a basic part of zoning regulation and
changes of this nature should involve a process similar to the original zoning
approval. See Millbrae Ass'n, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 264-66.
187. Creation of common areas used for open space, green area, or recreational
purposes is one of the beneficial aspects of the clustering technique. However,
there is a need to protect the land held in trust for these purposes to assure
that it is perpetually maintained. Once zoning is approved, it is the responsibility
of the owner as trustee for the land to be held in common to provide for the
necessary mechanisms for maintenance and conveyance to the ultimate user
organization, whether a homeowners association, park and recreation associa. tion, or condominium association. The zoning and site plan stages are used to
review the adequacy of these mechanisms. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY COUNTY,
MD., ZONING ORDINANCE § 59-0-1.3 (1994).
188. A development agreement can be an integral part of the flexible zoning process
to provide necessary infrastructure or other amenities and, in exchange, the
developer is provided with some certainty that the regulations will not be
changed while the project is built out. John J. Delaney, Development Agreements: The Road from Prohibition to "Let's Make a Deal!", 25 URB. LAW.
49, 49-50 (1993). In effect the development agreement provides for protection
against harsh effect of the vested rights doctrine and promotes financing of
infrastructure for large projects. Id.; see generally Patricia G. Hammes, Development Agreements: The Intersection of Real Estate Finance and Land Use
Controls, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 119 (1993).
189. See Estate of Friedman, 768 P.2d at 469.
190. {d.
191. {d.
192. The flexibility inherent in the zoning does not violate principles of uniformity.
Ziegler, supra note 147; see Prince George's County v. M & B Construction
Corp., 267 Md. 338, 363, 297 A.2d 683, 695 (1972); Orinda Homeowners
Comm., 90 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
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that the Barnes Commission used as a model for how planned
development can promote the Visions of 2020,,93 Columbia is developed under a New Town Zoning District,194 a floating zone containing
authorization for mixed uses, public amenities, and a range of
densities. 195 The zoning also provides flexibility to accommodate
staged, long term development that may be subject to changes in
market conditions. After a general concept plan is approved at the
. zoning stage,196 more detailed site plans are approved by a planning
board that functions as an administrative agency exercising delegated
responsibilities for site specific development under both design and
performance standards specified by the zoning district. 197
Columbia is near completion with a population of 75,000 people
living within an area of about 15,000 acres. 198 The creation of
visionary developer James W. Rouse, Columbia reflects the best of
the flexible techniques as it incorporates mixed uses and cluster forms
of development within an average gross density of two and one half
dwelling units per acre and preserves about one-third of the total
area, over 5,000 acres, for open space, recreational amenities, and
sensitive area protection. 199 Growth has avoided wetlands and other
sensitive areas, significant public facilities were provided by the
developer, and approvals were achieved with a minimum of delay
and expense given the size of the project. 200 The Columbia model
has been applied throughout Maryland in a number of smaller' scale
projects that provide a similar combination of public benefits and
streamlined regulation. 201
The use of these flexible techniques is discretionary for local
governments,202 but they are clearly superior to traditional zoning in
directing growth to suitable areas. Their use can assist in streamlining
193. BAY REPORT, supra note I, at 9.
194. HOWARD COUNTY, MD., ZONING REGULATIONS § 122 (1985); MORTON HOPPENFELD, THE COLUMBIA PROCESS: THE POTENTIAL FOR NEW TOWNS (1971).
195. HOWARD COUNTY, MD., ZONING REGULATIONS § 122A.8 (1985).
196. [d. § 122B.
197. [d. § 122C.
198. THE ROUSE CO., COLUMBIA, MARYLAND-HISTORY 2 (June 1993) [hereinafter
HISTORY); HOPPENFELD, supra note 194, at 16.
199. THE ROUSE CO., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1991); HOPPENFELD, supra note
194, at 16; HISTORY, supra note 198, at 2.
200. See generally HOPPENFELD, supra note 194.
201. For example, Montgomery Village is a planned new town of mixed uses and
densities and contains substantial open space with a population of 35,000
people living in 12,000 homes within an area of 2,500 acres. This project,
which is located in central Montgomery County, was developed under a zoning
scheme very similar to Howard County's New Town Zoning District and
carefully linked planning and zoning approvals. WILLIAM N. HURLEY, JR.,
MONTGOMERY VILLAGE-A NEW TOWN-TwENTY YEARS LATER 23-24 (1987).
202. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 10.01 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
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development review. For example, the flexible techniques can be
combined with existing development review procedures so that site
plan, subdivision, or permit reviews can occur simultaneously to
reduce delay. The Commission should be authorized to establish
policy guidance and incentives so that these techniques are not
misapplied or ignored. Revisions to state law are needed to expand
the basis for use of Euclidean zoning in a site specific context for
greater flexibility, as well as to promote use of floating zones as a
desirable alternative. Without greater incentives to use these flexible
techniques, sprawl development and cumbersome regulatory practices
will likely continue.

B.

Affordable Housing

Maryland has made the provlSlon of affordable housing a part
of state policy. 203 Many jurisdictions have initiated efforts to encourage the development of more affordable housing and use a
variety of techniques to promote the goal.204 Some use regulatory
approaches that require affordable housing as a component of larger
development projects. 20S Others simply encourage affordable housing
through incentive zoning,206 authorization for accessory housing on
existing 10ts,207 or relaxation of zoning design standards. 208
One inclusionary zoning technique used to promote affordable
housing is known as the moderately priced dwelling unit (MPDU)

203. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, §§ 1O.01(a)(3), 12.01 (Supp. 1994). California and
Oregon have adopted state policies promoting affordable housing. See DANIEL
R. MANDELKER, Land Use Law §§ 7.30-7.31 (3d ed. 1993); see also NATIONAL
HOUSING TASK FORCE, A DECENT PLACE TO LIVE 50-51 (Mar., 1988) (discussing
means of reducing regulatory constraints on the production of affordable
housing) [hereinafter ROUSE REPORT, after its Chairman, James W. Rouse];
see DEGRovE, supra note 9, at 21.
204. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 17-20.
205. The regulatory approval requires some minimum level of affordable housing.
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 18.
206. Incentive zoning uses a voluntary approach that offers higher densities in
exchange for an affordable housing component. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
5, at 18.
207. Accessory housing employs existing single family structures or lots to expand
the housing stock primarily through accessory apartments or separate "granny"
flats which are authorized by right or under a special exception process. ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 5, at 19.
208. Relaxation of design standards permits housing to be constructed at lower cost.
This technique includes relaxation of minimum area, lot, and yard requirements.
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 19-20. Some jurisdictions hold design
standards invalid if not rationally related to legitimate zoning objectives. See,
e.g., Builders Servo Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 545 A.2d 530, 550
(Conn. 1988).
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program, which is specifically authorized in Maryland. 209 The MPDU
program is designed to promote housing opportunities for persons
and families who would otherwise be excluded from the housing
market. 2lO This program is being used more frequently as a result of
pressures brought on by court decisions and state laws that prompt
local government to increase the availability of affordable housing.211
MPDUs promote affordable housing as a set aside program in which
below market housing is provided by developers in exchange for
density bonuses. 212 The program is administered with limitations
imposed on the use, cost, and resale of the housing.213
Several Maryland jurisdictions, on their own initiative, have
included affordable housing as an element of their comprehensive
plan. 214 Montgomery County was the first county in Maryland to
actually adopt a program for mandatory set asides for all housirig
projects of fifty units or more in which the approved density is two
dwelling units per acre or greater. 215 The Montgomery County program was adopted in 1973.216 In the same year a similar program in
neighboring Fairfax County, Virginia, was invalidated by the Virginia
courtS.217 Montgomery County adopted the program under its general
home rule police powers,218 rather than its zoning powers, due to the
absence of specific zoning enabling authority, a fatal defect for the
Fairfax County scheme. 219 The Montgomery County program has
never been challenged and, with the adoption of specific state enabling authority, 220 is unlikely to be attacked on the basis of lack of
authority.
209. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 1O.01(a)(3) (Supp. 1994).
210. ROUSE REPORT, supra note 203, at 50-51.
211. See Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1991); Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (Mt.
Laurel II); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
336 A.2d 713 (N.J.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (Mt. Laurel I);
RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 17.05(2)[d).
212. See ROUSE REPORT, supra note 203, at 49-50.
213. See MANDELKER, supra note 202, §§ 7.26-7.28.
214. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 17; see, e.g., HOWARD COUNTY, MD., 1990
GENERAL PLAN, supra note 12, 103-09, MONTGOMERY COUNTY DEP'T OF HousING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, HOUSING POLICY FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY
IN THE 1980s (1981).
215. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 25A, §§ 1-12 (1984).
216. Chap. 17, LAWS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., ch. 17 (1974); INVENTORY OF
AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN MONTGOMERY COUNTY 11 (1994) [hereinafter INVENTORY).
217. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County V. DeGroff Enters., 198 S.E.2d 600,
602 (Va. 1973).
218. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(s) (1994); MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CHARTER,
adopted Nov. 5, 1968; INVENTORY, supra note 216, at 11.
219. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax, 198 S.E.2d at 602.
220. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 10.01 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
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The Montgomery County program started producing MPDUs by
1976. 221 The program requires that each eligible housing project
include between twelve and one half percent and fifteen percent of
its total density as MPDUs.222 The builder may obtain a density
bonus of up to twenty two percent over and above the authorized
zoning density depending on site specific factors evaluated by the
Planning Board 223 -the administrative agency responsible for monitoring compliance with the program and approving waivers under
certain circumstances. 224
A county or nonprofit housing agency is given first priority to
purchase up to forty percent of the MPDUs in each project. 225 The
remaining MPDUs are sold to eligible buyers meeting income standards established by county regulation. 226 Eligible buyers are required
to live in the units and resale is subject to restrictions. 227 If the
resident sells the unit within the first ten years, the seller may only
receive the original purchase price and a cost of living index increase.228 If the resident sells the unit at a fair market price after the
ten year period, the sale is subject to a recapture provision of fifty
percent of any excess profits. 229
The location of affordable housing can be controversial. 230 Conflicts may arise between the developer, the local housing agency, and
neighbors. In one case, a developer of an upscale residential project
sought to locate the MPDUs off site, claiming that affordable housing
residents would be better off at an alternative location because the
upscale neighborhood lacked convenient access to public transportation and employment centers, and that the residents could not
afford expensive membership fees for community pool and recreational facilities. 231 Nonetheless, the county required the MPDUs to
be located on the site. m

221. Interview with Eric Larsen, MPDU Coordinator, Montgomery County Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD) (Aug. 24, 1993);
DHCD STATUS REPORT MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., DEP'T OF HOUSING &
COMMUNITY DEY., SUMMARY, REPORT & STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE MPDU
PROGRAM, 1989-91, (1993) (on file with author).
222. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 25A, § 5 (1984).
223. [d.; Larsen interview, supra note 221.
224. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch 25A, § 5 (1984).
225. [d. § 7; Larsen interview, supra note 221.
226. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 25A, § 4.
227. [d. § 9.
228. [d.
229. [d.
230. Kevin Sullivan, Some in Potomac Shudder at "Affordable" Housing, WASH.
POST, May 17, 1993, at B1.
231. [d.
232. [d.
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The Montgomery County program compares favorably with New
Jersey's famous court imposed Mt. Laurel housing program. 233 The
Montgomery County program has produced 8,442 MPDUs over
seventeen years,234 while the entire state of New Jersey has produced
13,723 Mt. Laurel units during a similar period.235 The Montgomery
County program has achieved national recognition and serves as a
model for other Maryland jurisdictions. 236
The need for affordable housing is well established,237 and the
recent amendments in state law will, no doubt, promote more of it
than would otherwise be available. Unfortunately, the policy for
affordable housing is discretionary for local governments, which are
not required to include affordable housing as an element of local
comprehensive plans.238 This flaw should be corrected by requiring
affordable housing as a mandatory element of local plans, which
must then be implemented under the consistency requirement. If
applied as intended, this will minimize the gap between planning
objectives and regulatory practices. There is also a need to assign to
the Commission the responsibility for determining minimum levels
of participation. 239 Local governments should be required to authorize
sufficient densities in designated growth areas to support affordable
housing programs 240 and use the set aside authority to provide affordable housing as components of developments of a certain size.
C.

Resource Conservation and Protection oj Sensitive Areas

Protection of sensitive areas is a special concern of the Planning
Act, which delineates four areas for consideration: streams and their
buffers, habitats of threatened and endangered species, steep slopes,
and 100 year floodplains. 241 These four areas are particularly susceptible to damage by the cumulative impact of development. 242 The
range of protection currently afforded these areas varies from non233. See generally Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount

234.
235.
236.

237.

238.
239.

240.
241.
242.

Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (Mt. Laurel II); Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.), cert. denied 423
U.S. 808 (1975) (Mt. Laurel I); INVENTORY, supra note 216, at 11-15.
Larsen interview, supra note 221.
Robert Hanley, Open Housing Is Mired in Lawsuits Again, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
2, 1990, at 81.
Larsen interview, supra note 221; see ROUSE REPORT, supra note 203, at 27;
William K. Stevens, Scattered Low-Cost Housing Offers Renewed Hope to
Poor and Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1988, at B6.
ROUSE REPORT, supra note 203, at 5-8.
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 668, § 12.01(a) (Supp. 1994).
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 34-35, 50-51.
Id.; see DEGROVE, supra note 9, at 20-21.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 3.06(b) (Supp. 1994).
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 16-17.
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existent tei very stringent. 243 The Commission has identified the need
to implement this state policy through regulation, the responsibility
for which squarely rests on local governments. 244
Farms and forests are the most threatened resources,245 yet the
Planning Act provides little in the way of protective measures.
Protection of these resources is primarily the responsibility of local
government and can only be achieved through restrictive zoning
regulations that prohibit harmful uses. 246 Restrictive zoning means
density low enough to discourage sprawl development and yet provide
some reasonable use of the land. 247 Agricultural zoning has been
regularly upheld,248 and densities as low as one dwelling unit for 160
acres have been determined appropriate under certain circumstances. 249
This type of zoning, however, represents a severe curtailment of
property owners' expectations of potential development rights. While
some legal experts believe that the police power supports these
limitations without the need for compensation,250 the loss of investment backed expectations and the political consequences of these lost
expectations may compromise or lessen the scope of regulation at
the expense of the land to be conserved. Indeed, only five Maryland
counties have adopted protective agricultural zoning. 251 A more practical approach employs a combination of restrictive zoning and the
use of transferable development rights (TDRs).
TDRs are devices used to conserve or protect areas such as
agricultural lands, forests, historic districts or landmarks, and environmentally sensitive areas.252 The authority for this flexible device
was adopted in' 1986253 and has been used in Maryland 254 and else-

243. For example, Worchester County has not developed goals, policies, or regulations on any of the four categories, while most urban counties have stringent
regulations. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 13-14 (Supp. 1993).
244. See id. at 17.
245. [d. at 34-35.
246. Couglin, Formulating and Evaluating Agricultural Zoning Programs, APA
JOURNAL 183, 183-92 (Spring 1991).
247. See generally MANDELKER, supra note 203, ch. 12; DEGRovE, supra note 9, at
21-22.
248. [d.
249. See County of Ada v. Henry, 668 P.2d 994 (Idaho 1983).
250. See MANDELKER, supra note 203, § 12.
251. The five counties requiring a minimum density of at least one dwelling unit
per 20 acres are Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Caroline, Carroll, and Montgomery.
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 7.
252. MANDELKER, supra note 203, § 12.13.
253. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 11.01 (1988).
254. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 24 (Supp. 1993).
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where.2SS Montgomery County inaugurated a successful TOR program
in 1981 in order to preserve agriculture and rural open space.256 The
program links comprehensive planning and zoning with market demand for housing to provide for a viable transfer device that results
in agricultural easements in exchange for more concentrated densities
in designated growth areas.257
Montgomery County adopted the program following a planning
study that determined that rural zoning by itself was not effectively
conserving agriculture and that large amounts of agricultural land
were being converted to sprawl development. 2S8 The planning study
concluded that there was a need to take stringent measures and
recommended a massive downzoning of agricultural land to be accompanied by a TOR program to offset lost development expect ations.259
About 91,591 acres of agricultural land and rural open space,
which represents twenty-eight percent of the County's 323,862 acres,
were downzoned in 1981 from a five-acre authorized density to a
twenty-five-acre density with a minimum lot size of 40,000 square
feet. 260 The zoning category used for this purpose is the Rural Density
Transfer (ROT) zone,261 which permits one dwelling unit per twentyfive acres and creates five TORs for each twenty-five acres.262 For a
100 acre farm, the property owner is provided with the choice of
developing it with four residential units, retaining it in agricultural
or open space use and selling twenty TORs, or a combination of the
two methods. For example, the owner could develop one dwelling
unit which automatically extinguishes one TOR, and sell the remaining nineteen TORs.
Selection of receiving areas poses both legal and political problems. 263 A receiving area is located in a designated growth area and
255. Mandelker, supra note 203, § 12.13; see, e.g., Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands
Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1991); Barancik v. County of Marin, 872 F.2d
834 (9th Cir. 1988), cerl. denied, 493 U.S. 894 (1989).
256. MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION, THE TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PROGRAM FOR THE PRESERVATION OF AGRICULTURE AND RURAL OPEN SPACE, STATUS REPORT (July 1992) [hereinafter TDR
STATUS REPORT).
257. [d. at 1-5.
258. MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK & PLANNING COMMISSION, FUNCTIONAL
MASTER PLAN FOR THE PRESERVATION OF AGRICULTURAL & RURAL OPEN SPACE
IN MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., 12-25 (1980).
259. [d. at 27-31.
260. NORMAN L. CHRIST ELLER, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP TO EVALUATE THE
AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL OPEN SPACE PRESERVATION PROGRAMS 13-14 (Feb.
2, 1988) [hereinafter TDR WORKING GROUP REPORT); TDR STATUS REPORT,
supra note 256, at 1-14.
261. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE § 59-C-9.6 (1994).
262. [d. §§ 59-C-9.41, 59-C-9.6.
263. See TDR WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 260, at 15-21.
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will host density increases above the level authorized by conventional
zoning. 264 Density increases may generate opposition from the nearby
community. An attack by neighbors produced a temporary invalidation of the Montgomery County program 265 and prompted curative
measures to readopt the program with adequate zoning districts. 266
The program currently employs a variety of receiving area zoning
districts,267 which are normally applied by comprehensive zoning at
locations specified as suitable for higher densities by master plans. 268
Once the receiving areas are applied to the zoning map, the
program is implemented through the subdivision process. 269 When a
developer acquires TDRs for use on land zoned for higher TDR
density, a subdivision plan must be approved with the TOR sale and
an easement recordation verified.270 A county agency responsible for
subdivision approval provides oversight and monitors the implementation of the system. 271 All sales and easement recordation data are
retained in computer-based storage, which is used to verify the TOR
implementation process.272 To date, the system has worked successfully, without incidents of fraud or attempts to reuse TDRs.273
Montgomery County's program has been implemented in an
incremental fashion with more receiving areas being designated as
comprehensive planning and zoning actions identifying suitable areas
fQr growth.274 When the program was first established there were no
receiving areas designated,27S and a TOR fund was created to purchase
TDRs in hardship situations. 276 Notwithstanding the absence of receiving areas, the program survived a legal challenge. 277
The Montgomery County program is gradually achieving equilibrium between supply and demand. Not all land classified in the
RDT zone is appropriate to be under a TOR easement because some
of it is public parkland or open space, some is already under either

264. [d.

~

265. See West Montgomery Citizens Ass'n v. Maryland-National Capital Park &
Planning Comm'n, 309 Md. 183, 186, 522 A.2d 1328, 1329 (1987).
266. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE § 59-C-1.33 (1994).
267. See id.
268. TOR WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 260, at 13-14.
269. [d. at 15-21.
270. [d.
271. [d.
272. Interview with Oenis Canavan, Senior Planner and TOR Coordinator, Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (Aug. 24, 1993).
273. [d.
274. [d.
275. See TOR Working Group Report, supra note 260, at I.
276. [d.
277. Oefour v. Montgomery County Council, Law Nos. 56964, 56969, 56983, Circuit
Court for Montgomery County (1983) (J. McAullife).
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state or county agricultural easement, and some is already developed
for residential purposes.278 About 26,182 acres fall within these categories and will not use TO Rs. 279 The remaining 65,409 acres represent
potential TOR sending areas for 12,297 TORs.280 By July, 1992, the
designated receiving areas increased to a level capable of hosting
11,650 TORs.281 As the supply and demand have, more or less, settled
into equilibrium, the unit price of the TORs has reached about
$10,000.282 The TOR fund was never used and was eliminated by
administrati ve actio n. 283
The TOR program will be completed when the remaining TORs
are sold and easements recorded. 284 So far, easements have been
recorded for 3,185 TORs, resulting in a minimum of 15,925 acres
being preserved for agriculture and rural open space. 285 There are
2,174 additional TDRs sold and awaiting approval under the subdivision process, which will result in an additional 10,870 acres under
easement. 286 This total of 26,795 acres under a TOR easement represents about forty-one percent of the potential supply under the
program. 287
Resource conservation and protection of sensitive areas are prime
objectives of the Visions of 2020 because of their direct relationship
to the health of the Chesapeake Bay.288 Without protective zoning
and other regulatory measures, the objectives will not be achieved.
Once local governments determine the areas to be protected as part
of a local plan, there must be corresponding regulation of these
areas. If this effort does not occur, then the state must consider
imposition of regulation as recommended by the 2020 proposals289
because these areas are far too important to risk to future development.

D.

Funding Mechanisms
The Visions of 2020 anticipated that funding mechanisms would
be in place to support growth in suitable areas. 290 In effect, the

278. TOR WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 260, at 16.
279. See TOR Status Report, supra note 256.

280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Canavan Interview, supra note 272.

283. Id.
284. [d.
285. TOR STATUS REPORT, supra note 256, at 8.

286. [d.
287. Id.
288. BAY REPORT, supra note 1. The American Farmland Trust recently concluded
that four Maryland counties are at risk of losing substantial areas of farmland
to development. Deb Riechmann, Four Maryland Counties Losing Ground,
MONTGOMERY J., July 19, 1993, at A3.
289. Maryland Growth and Chesapeake Bay Protection Act of 1991; S. 227, 1991
Sess. (Md. 1991); H.D. 214, 1991 Sess. (Md. 1991).
290. 2020 REPORT, supra note 3.
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Visions contemplate a concurrency standard 291 that requires that
adequate public facilities be in place for areas where development is
to be approved.292 Concurrency means that growth can only be
considered suitable if roads, schools, parks, and other necessary
public facilities are adequate to support the growth.293 If funding
mechanisms are not in place to provide these facilities concurrent
with anticipated growth, then the designated area is not suitable for
growth until the necessary facilities are available. 294 The Planning
Act, however, modified the policy pertaining to funding mechanisms
and substituted a vague objective that funding mechanisms need only
be addressed.295 This modification is a significant retreat from the
Visions of 2020.
The practice of deferring growth and related development approvals until public facilities are deemed adequate has received judicial support in Maryland based on all types of public facilities. 296
The adequacy of public facilities is usually measured in terms of
levels of service (LOS)297 under standards contained in an adequate
public facilities ordinance (APFO) or related growth policy documents. 298 The purpose of the APFO is to ensure that development
does not occur unless the capacity of public facilities is adequate to
absorb the proposed growth. 299
. The APFO is a regulatory device used to control the timing and
pace of development, the use and density of which has already been
authorized by zoning. 3°O Applied before development authorizations
are issued, the APFO permits local government to evaluate the impact
of development on existing and planned public facilities and delay
development approvals if the facilities are found to be inadequate to
accommodate the proposed growth under a LOS threshold deemed
appropriate for a particular locality.30I

291.. See generally DEGROVE, supra note 9, at 7, 16-20 (discussing the concept of
concurrency).

292. [d.
293. [d.
294. [d.
295. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5-708(7) (Supp. 1994).
296. Shapiro v. Montgomery County, 269 Md. 380, 388, 306 A.2d 253, 257 (1973)
(schools); Montgomery County Council v. Pleasants, 266 Md. 462, 466-67, 295
A.2d 216, 217 (1972) (sewers); Price v. Cohen, 213 Md. 457, 464, 132 A.2d
125, 129 (1957) (roads).
297. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., ANNUAL GROWTH POLICY, July, 1993; William
E. Baumgaertner & John W. Guckert, APFO: A Successful Growth Management Tool, 1993 J. OF MD. PLANNING 10; DEGROVE, supra note 9, at 17-20.
298. See supra note 296.
299. See supra note 296.
300. See supra note 296.
301. See supra note 296.
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The APFO is now authorized for discretionary use by local
governments. 302 State law neglects, however, to provide any policy
direction on the use of the APFO. The more effective APFOs address
a range of public facilities and evaluate the cumulative impact of
·growth. 303 Some APFOs, however, have limited application and do
not evaluate public facilities that are the responsibility of other levels
of government,304 or focus only on the immediate area,305 or examine
only present conditions without considering future growth. 306 These
shortcomings cause an underestimate of future growth that will be
unsupported by adequate facilities over time. 307
If an APFO review finds inadequacy, then funding mechanisms
must be identified which are reasonably probable of fruition in the
foreseeable future30 8 and will provide adequate facilities to support
the development. 309 If state or local governments are unable to provide
funding, alternative sources must be identified if the development is
to be approved. 310 The APFO usually contains provisions for mitigation to allow development to proceed so long as private sector
funding provides the necessary facilities. 311
Flexible zoning is another technique that affects funding for
public facilities. Incentive zoning provides public amenities or facilities
that reduce the need for public funding sources.312 Mixed use zoning
provides a balance between employment and housing which encourages
pedestrian traffic and shorter vehicle trips, thus easing the impact of
growth on transportation facilities and public funding sources. 313
Several other techniques include development agreements314 and various types of private sector contributions through impact fees 315 or
302. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 10.01 (Supp. 1994). The Commission reports that
12 counties and 10 municipalities have enacted APFOs. ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 5, Supplement, Matrix 2.8A, 2.8B, at 31-36.
303. Baumgaertner, supra note 297.
304. See supra note 302; Philip J. Tierney, Maryland's Growing Pains: The Need
jor State Regulation, 16 U. BALT. L. REV. 201, 238 (1987).
305. Tierney, supra note 304, at 238-40.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Montgomery County v. Greater Colesville Citizens Ass'n, 70 Md. App. 374,
387-88, 521 A.2d 770, 777 (1987).
309. MONTGOMERY COUNTY ANNUAL GROWTH POLICY 13-16 (July, 1993).
310. Greater Colesville, 70 Md. App. at 387-88, 521 A.2d at 777 .
. 311. Baumgaertner, supra note 297; see Golden v. Planning Bd .• 285 N.E.2d 291
(N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
312. Kayden, supra note 178.
313. BAY REPORT, supra note I, at 7.
314. Delaney, supra note 188.
315. DEGRovE, supra note 9, at 24. Maryland courts require explicit authority for
impact fees. and home rule authority has been held insufficient as a basis for
these fees. Eastern Diversified Properties, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 319
Md. 45, 570 A.2d 850 (1990).
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316

development taxes.
A new funding mechanism was authorized in
1992 and provides for off-site improvements under certain circumstances.317 The authorization for off-site improvements allows exactions for needed facilities and wisely includes a nexus requirement,318
which codifies both Maryland 319 and federaP20 legal requirements for
the imposition of exactions.
Funding mechanisms are critical to concentrating growth in
suitable areas. Use of the concurrency standard provides an important
incentive to direct growth to areas with excess infrastructure but in
need of revitalization. 321 Yet, the Planning Act provides a weakened
policy objective that needs to be strengthened in order to make the
state growth policy consistent with the Visions of 2020. The Commission should also be assigned rule-making authority for the use of
growth management regulations.
V.

POTENTIAL IMPEDIMENTS TO STATE POLICY

Achievement of the state growth policy will be difficult enough
without having to deal with several potential impediments to the
effective implementation of the policy. These impediments include
the takings challenge, shifts in the presumption of regulatory validity,
the inability to employ site-specific use conditions when discretionary
zoning is approved, and the application of a strict vested rights
doctrine.

A.

Takings Challenge

The takings challenge is based on the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and its Just Compensation Clause.322 The
challenge is concerned with land use regulations imposing onerous
burdens on certain property owners that should more fairly be

316. DEGRavE, supra note 9, at 24. A development impact tax was upheld as a
properly authorized excise tax. Waters Landing Ltd. Ptnshp.· v. Montgomery
County, 337 Md. 15, 650 A.2d 712 (1994).
317. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § IO.Ol(a)(2) (Supp. 1994).
318. [d.

319. Howard County v. J.J.M., Inc., 301 Md. 256, 282, 482 A.2d 908, 921 (1984).
320. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-37 (1987); Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
321. Kaplan, supra note 17.
322. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is incorporated
against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, Chicago B & 0 R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897), provides that "private property [shall not)
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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assumed by the public. m How the takings challenge is applied
involves an examination of the character of the reguiation J24 and the
impact on the affected property.325 In 1922, when the United States
Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,326 held that a
noninvasive police power regulation went "too far" and became a
"taking" of private property by the government, the seeds of the
regulatory takings doctrine were planted and its first fruits would be
produced years later to the consternation of local government officials.327
Because the Supreme Court ignored the regulatory takings doctrine for over fifty years,328 state courts initially determined the limits
of land use regulations under a substantive due process analysis and
violations involved the traditional remedy of invalidation of the
regulation. 329 As the states were formulating their due process jurisprudence, a more narrow view of property emerged that subordinated
private property rights in favor of the general welfare. 330 The New
Deal, the decline of the Lochner33 I era view of property rights,332 and
the development of administrative law provided the basis for the
emergence of more deference to legislative action, particularly with
323. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); MANDELKER, supra note
203, § 2.01; Norman N. Williams, Jr., A Narrow Escape?, 16 ZONING &
PLANNING LAW REPORT 113, 115-17 (1993).
324. MANDELKER, supra note 203, § 2.01.
325. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49 (1960); MANDELKER, supra note 203, § 2.01;
Williams, supra note 323, at 115-17.
326. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
327. See Williams, supra note 323, at 123-26; Charles R. Wise, The Changing
Doctrine of Regulatory Takings and the Executive Branch, 44 ADMIN. L. REV.
403, 409-13 (1992).
328. Forty-six years elapsed between the two regulatory takings cases. Pennsylvania
Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
329. MANDELKER, supra note 203, § 2.25; Williams, supra note 323, at 115-17.
330. The progressive income tax, welfare programs, and rent control are several
examples. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870-1960, at 3-7, 213-46, 263-64 (1992). Subordination of property rights to
larger public interest concerns is not simply a product of progressive legal
thinkers but enjoys a wider following. For example, Pope John Paul, II,
provided the following view about subordination of private property rights:
Christian tradition has never upheld [private property ... rights) as
absolute and untouchable. On the contrary, it has always understood
this right within the broader context of the right common to all to
use the goods of the whole of creation: the right to private property
is subordinated to the right to common use, to the fact that goods
are meant for everyone.
THE ENCYCLICAL LETTER OF POPE JOHN PAUL II, LABOREM EXERCENS ch. 14,
at 35, Sept. 14, 1981 (emphasis in original).
331. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
332. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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respect to land use regulation. 333 With changing notions of property
and the decline of Lochner influence, conservative thinkers returned
to the Holmes dictum in Pennsylvania Coal for support and, beginning in the 1970s, the takings challenge began to emerge in a new
package with links for the first time to the Just Compensation Clause
instead of the Due Process Clause. 334
The Supreme Court first considered this new takings challenge
in 1978 in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 335
The Court declined to formulate any fixed rules, however. 336 The
Court's then liberal majority expressed a preference for a case by
case evaluation. The Court applied a balancing test with three elements: the character of the government action, the extent to which
the regulations affect investment-backed expectations, and the economic impact of the regulations. 337 Subsequently, however, the Court's
increasingly conservative membership succeeded in establishing fixed
rules about property rights 338 and began to identify categories that
limited the scope of legislative actions and the deference to be
accorded them. 339
A more conservative Supreme Court in three recent decisions,
No//an v. California Coastal Commission,341l Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 341 and Dolan v. City of Tigard,342 began a shift
away from the view that property is a creation of law and its
regulation is entitled to judicial deference. No//an abandoned traditional deference as applied in other types of constitutional challenges 343
333. HORWITZ, supra note 330, at 213-46; Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590 (1962).
334. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), was, of course, a due
process case and did not involve the Just Compensation Clause despite the
dictum of Justice Holmes. Patrick C. McGinley, Regulatory "Takings": The
Remarkable Resurrection of Economic Substantive Due Process Analysis in
Constitutional Law, 17 ENVIR. LAW RPTR. 10369 (Sept. 1987); Williams, supra
note 323, at 117-26; Wise, supra note 327, at 409-13. The just compensation
theory of regulatory takings was initially rejected by two leading state courts.
See Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (Cal.
1979), afi'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
335. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
336. [d. at 124.
337. [d.
338. Williams, supra note 323, at 117-26.
339. [d.; Robert A. Williams, Jr., Legal Discourse, Social Vision and the Supreme
Court's Land Use Planning Law: The Genealogy of the Lochnerian Recurrence
in First English Lutheran Church and Nollan, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 427, 45573 (1988).
340. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
341. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
342. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
343. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3.
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and shifted the presumption of validity normally accorded land use
regulations at least when an invasive regulation is involved. 344 Lucas
further eroded traditional deference with the application of a common-law nuisance baseline to regulations that destroy value. 345 Lucas
rejected the liberal contention that regulations necessary for public
health or safety purposes, which sometimes exact uneven burdens on
property owners, are still entitled to deference because the legislature
is the best forum to resolve distributive issues. 346 Instead, Lucas
reasserted longstanding conservative suspicions of the legislature 347
and limited the impact of Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v.
De Benedictis,348 which provided the basis for the state court's
affirmation of the South Carolina beach protection regulation. 349 The
Keystone majority had earlier suggested that regulations with health
and safety objectives were virtually immune from a takings challenge
under a nuisance exception. 350 Keystone was modified on this point,351
but was not directly overruled.
Dolan continued the recent trend to undercut traditional presumptions of validity and deference to the legislature by imposing
new requirements for local governments to establish both a reasonable
nexus and rough proportionality between exactions and the impact
of development. 352 Exactions, the requirement for contribution of
property or money to alleviate the impact of development in exchange
for development approval, are customary devices used by local governments to obtain property or funds for roads, schools, parks, and
other public facilities, the need for which is caused at least in part
by the new development. 353 When the government seeks to acquire a
property right-such as the right to exclude-the burden is now on
the government to establish adequate nexus and proportionality using
an individualized analysis and subject to heightened judicial scru-

344. Some believe that Nollan's heightened scrutiny is limited to situations involving
a permanent physical occupation. See Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88
COL. L. REV. 1600, 1612-14 (1988).
345. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
346. Id. The decision also threatens the basis for all environmental regulations that
limit property to natural uses. See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the
Economy oj Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
45 STAN. L. REV. 1433 (1993).
347. HORWITZ, supra note 330, at 213-46.
348. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
349. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (1991), rev'd, 112
S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
350. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
351. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2886.
352. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
353. See id. at 2317-19.
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tiny.354 Since the local government in Dolan was attempting to
implement state policy under a comprehensive plan and regulation,
the Supreme Court's decision is a disappointing loss for plan-based
regulation because the majority neglected to analyze the total economic impact of the government's action on the property owner. As
Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, the Court chose to ignore
both the benefits received by the property owner from the government's approval and the impact of the government's actions on the
value of the whole parcel,355 and instead imposed a Lochner era type
review to support a finding of an unconstitutional condition. 356
Despite the conservative trend in recent decisions, there has not
been a substantial redefinition of property when a takings analysis
is required.357 Before Dolan, a discrete property interest could not
be conceptually severed 358 from the whole parcel and considered
individually for a takings analysis without reference to the effect of
the regulation on the entire parcel. Dolan modified this view at least
as it applies to discrete property interest sought by the government
for public use by way of dedication. 359 Nevertheless, Dolan does not
threaten protective zoning for farmlands, floodplains, or other environmental purposes even if the value of the property is substantially
diminished by the regulation. In this respect, the whole parcel analysis
is still viable. 360 Indeed, if the whole parcel approach is abandoned,

354. See id. The heightened judicial scrutiny is applied in an adjudicative setting
and may not apply when the challenged regulatory action is legislative in
character.
355. Id. at 2324-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In its takings analysis, the conservative
majority ignored the factor of increased property values resulting from government approvals and other actions such as infrastructure improvements. See
id. at 2319-22; see also Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d
442 (Wis. 1965). Surely, the increased property values represent a legitimate
factor in any taking analysis to determine the true economic impact of government action on a particular property. See Edward Thompson, Jr., The
Government Giveth, II ENVIRON. FORUM, No.2 at 22 (Mar.! Apr. 1994).
356. Dwight H. Merriam & R. Jeffrey Lyman, Dealing with Dolan, Practically and
Jurisprudentially, 17 ZONING & PLANNING L. REP. 57, 62-63 (Sept., 1994).
357. The majority in Dolan was narrowly applied and exempted protective zoning
from the decision. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2309. Nevertheless, the Lucas
majority did signal that a clarification of the affected property interest and
the notion of a partial taking remain on the conservative agenda. Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7, 2895 n.8 (1992).
Support for both points are found in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,
28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994), and Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18
F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
358. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception oj Property: Cross Currents
in the Jurisprudence oj Takings, 88 COL. L. REV. 1667, 1674-78 (1988).
359. In this respect, the decision involves an invasive regulation as in Nollan and
may be limited to that situation. See Michelman, supra note 344.
360. Williams, supra note 323, at 123-27. See Richard M. Frank, Inverse Condem-
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every residential front yard setback restriction will be vulnerable to
attack even though the entire lot enjoys a reasonable use 361 and
property owners could manipulate conveyances under existing regulations to create takings while enjoying reasonable and profitable
uses on their remaining interests.
States may be reluctant to replace their long-established tests for
evaluating takings challenges. There are difficulties inherent in the
application of these Supreme Court decisions.362 The Supreme Court
of Washington has twice tried to formulate an application of the
United States Supreme Court's rules to land use regulations and
produced confusion for both regulators and developers.363 Maryland
has long followed an analysis centering on denial of all reasonable
use. 364 The Maryland courts have yet to apply the fixed rules and
prefer the case by case approach with deference to the legislature on
issues of public purposes of the regulation and a focus on the
economic impact of the regulation. 365
The takings challenge is now well established and provides
boundaries beyond which government regulation should not go.
Recent Supreme Court decisions will require local governments to
exercise careful planning and administration when providing discretionary approvals in exchange for public amenities. The government
may be required to demonstrate that the public amenities bear a
reasonable relationship and a rough proportionality to the subject
matter of the approval.
The application of the state growth policy can certainly coexist
with the takings challenge if local governments are careful in crafting

361.
362.

363.
364.

365.

nation Litigation in the 1990s- The Uncertain Legacy oj the Supreme Court's
Lucas and Yee Decisions, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 85, 102-04
(1993). In Do/an, the majority ignored the balance of the property interests.
Presumably, the Washington State court will evaluate the entire property interest
when determining whether the rough proportionality test can be satisfied.
See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987);
Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
The decisions leave many questions to be resolved that include distinguishing
between takings and substantive due process violations, identifying invasive
and noninvasive regulations, defining the property interests to be evaluated,
and dealing with the notion of partial takings.
Compare Allingham v. City of Seattle, 749 P.2d 160 (Wash. 1988) with
Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 787 P.2d 907 (Wash.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 911 (1990).
For recent discussions of Maryland's takings jurisprudence, see Lone v. Montgomery County, 85 Md. App. 477, 584 A.2d 142 (1991); Offen v. County
Council, 96 Md. App. 526, 625 A.2d 424 (1993), rev'd on other grounds,
County Council v. Offen, 334 Md. 499, 639 A.2d 1070 (1994).
Maryland courts have applied a whole parcel analysis when evaluating the
economic impact of a regulation. See North v. St. Mary's County, 99 Md.
App. 502, 638 A.2d 1175 (1994).
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their regulations and state law is revised to provide better policy
direction. The takings challenge underscores the need for the use by
local governments of the flexible techniques and streamlined approaches now authorized under state law. These new approaches will
enable local governments to adopt regulations for site-specific conditions and provide for a variety of uses that will benefit both the
property owner and the public.

B.

Shift in Presumption of Validity
Since at least 1926 and Euclid v. A mbler Realty Co. ,366 a
presumption of validity has applied to land use regulations which
are only invalidated if clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and with
no substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare. 367 The courts have continued to apply the presumption of validity to ordinary land use disputes. 368 Generally, the
presumption is evaluated under an ends-means test. 369
The presumption of validity is under attack by property rights
advocates 370 and this attack corresponds to a shift in the presumption
366. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
367. The regulation is upheld if the basis for it is "fairly debatable." Euclid, 272
U.S. at 395. The fairly debatable standard was formulated by the Supreme
Court in a facial challenge to a legislative action. [d. Whether this same
standard should also be applied to administrative or adjudicatory actions is an
interesting question after Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994),
although Maryland courts have applied the fairly debatable standard to adjudicatory decisions. See Enviro-Gro Technologies v. Bockelmann, 88 Md. App.
323, 594 A.2d 1190, cert. denied, 325 Md. 94, 599 A.2d 447 (1991). Maryland
courts, however, have not always been deferential to the legislature when
reviewing land use regulation. See Byrne v. Maryland Realty Co., 129 Md.
202, 98 A. 547 (1916) (separation of semi-detached houses in residential areas
is not a valid basis for police power regulation).
368. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Mears v.
Town of Oxford, 52 Md. App. 407, 449 A.2d 1165 (1982) (attacker must show
absence of public benefit).
369. The end purpose of the regulation must relate to legitimate government
objectives and the means employed must be reasonable and not oppressive.
See Levinson v. Montgomery County, 95 Md. App. 307, 620 A.2d 961, cert.
denied, 331 Md. 197, 627 A.2d 539 (1993). The ends-means test has a long
history in Maryland. See Byrne v. Maryland Realty Co., 129 Md. 202, 98 A.
547 (1916) (segregation of multifamily from single family housing based on
aesthetics, an unreasonable means); Tighe v. Osborne, 149 Md. 349, 131 A.
801 (1925) (public welfare justification too broad to be proper end for regulation
that restricts property rights); Tighe v. Osborne, 150 Md. 452, 133 A. 465
(1926) (health and safety justification supports regulation against due process
attack).
370. President Reagan's Commission on Housing concluded in 1982 that the presumption should be replaced with a requirement that governments show that
land use regulations are necessary to achieve a "vital and pressing governmental
interest." BERNARD SIEGAN, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HousING, LAND USE LAW 7 (Nov. 1982); see Williams, supra note 323, at 122-23.
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in several areas where constitutional and important public policy
issues are at stake.371 The presumption shifts when land use regulations involve exclusionary zoning,372 unconstitutional intrusions,373
discriminatory c1assifications,374 and malfunctions of the zoning process. 375
The erosion of the presumption poses a clear threat to the use
of flexible techniques necessary to implement the state growth policy.
For example, incentive zoning or TORs provide for added density in
exchange for public amenities. 376 Property rights advocates may contend that the higher densities are being withheld for later sale, when
they should have been applied to the land in the first place instead
of imposing burdens on a select class of property owners who happen
to own property with enough development potential to support the
zoning scheme. 377 This argument concludes that the government, by
use of these zoning schemes, expropriates market value for resale. 378
The presumption of validity is critical to local government's
defense of land use regulatory programs. The flexible techniques now
authorized by state law involve redistributive measures which have
historically enjoyed deference and would likely survive ends-means
analysis. 379 The flexible techniques are not likely to be found to

371. Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. I (1992).
372. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d
713 (N.J.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (Mt. Laurel I); Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (Mt.
Laurel II).
373. NoHan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); see Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (invasive regulatory takings); Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993) (suppression of religious activity); City of Ladue v. GiHeo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994);
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993) (unreasonable limitations on protected modes of expression) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
374. See, e.g., Kirsch v. Prince George's County, 331 Md. 89, 626 A.2d 372, cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 600 (1993); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977);
State v. Baker, 405 A.2d 368 (N.J. 1979); City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson,
610 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1980); Verzi v. Baltimore County, 333 Md. 411, 635 A.2d
967 (1994).
375. Malfunction of the zoning process is illustrated by cases where the public
interest is subordinated for private benefit contrary to the comprehensive plan.
In this situation, courts do not accord the presumption to the government's
action. MANDELKER, supra note 203.
376. Kayden, supra note 178, at 3-8; TDR STATUS REPORT, supra note 256, at 2-5.
377. See Kayden, supra note 178, at 3-8.
378. 'd.
379. See Levinson v. Montgomery County, 95 Md. App. 307,620 A.2d 961 (1993).
The majority in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), did not
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constitute a takings because property owners retain valuable property
rights. 380 The problem will occur under a substantive due process
challenge where local government misapplies the flexible techniques
in a shocking, arbitrary, or capricious manner. 381 Clear policy direction will minimize the risks of any shift in the presumption.
C.

Conditional Zoning

One of the major features of the flexible techniques is the ability
to tailor development to take advantage of unique characteristics of
a particular site 382 and rely on site-specific use conditions. 383 For
example, PUDs often include mixed uses which vary in the type and
intensity of use,384 and are not intended to be uniform.385 These
flexible zoning' techniques allow for limitations on uses, density,
building locations, and other physical features of development and
permit local governments to respond quickly to changing market
forces. 386 The town of Columbia, Maryland illustrates this approach
with its substantial park land and transportation facilities all dependent on conditions imposed in exchange for zoning approval. 387
In a general sense, these techniques employ use conditions which
may run afoul of a Maryland common-law doctrine that prohibits
conditional zoning. 388 Although conditional zoning was authorized by

380.
381.

382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

abandon the presumption in cases involving general and noninvasive application
of legislative policy, even when the application involves substantial diminution
of property values.
See Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, 280 Md. 686, 376 A.2d
483 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978).
To be successful under a substantive due process claim, both a property interest
and abusive government action must be shown. Compare Gardner v. City of
Baltimore, 969 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1992), and G.M. Eng'rs & Assocs., Inc. v.
West Bloomfield Township, 922 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1990) with Bateson v.
Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1988) and Herrington v. Sonoma County, 834
F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1987).
2 RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 29A.02[IJ.
[d.
5 RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 63.01.
[d. § 63.02.
[d.
HOWARD COUNTY ZONING REGULATIONS § 122 (1985).
The conditional zoning doctrine finds its roots in Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md.
136, 96 A.2d 27 (1953). The Court of Appeals continued to explain its
dissatisfaction with conditional zoning in a series of decisions that involved
the ad hoc conditions imposed by local governments at the time of zoning
approval. See Montgomery County v. National Capital Realty Corp., 267 Md.
364, 297 A.2d 675 (1972); Marathon Builders, Inc. v. Polinger, 263 Md. 410,
283 A.2d 617 (1971); Carole Highlands Citizens Ass'n v. Board of Courity
Comm'rs, 222 Md. 44, 158 A.2d 663 (1960); Pressman v. Mayor of Baltimore,
222 Md. 330, 160 A.2d 379 (1960); Rose v. Paape, 221 Md. 369, 157 A.2d
618 (1960); Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959).
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the state legislature in 1975,389 the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland has narrowly construed that authorization and applied the
conditional zoning doctrine in a manner that is not based on sound
policy or law. 390
Conditions imposed through the flexible zoning process could
avoid any vulnerability under the conditional zoning doctrine if the
conditions are made part of a traditional zoning scheme under . a
more cumbersome approach. For example, a developer selects a sIte
and makes plans for site specific development that are then made
part of a zoning text amendment that authorizes the conditional
form of development following a legislative process including planning analysis, notice, and public hearings. A new zoning district is
then adopted which authorizes the site-specific development. The
district is then applied to the site by either comprehensive or piecemeal
rezoning which involves another round of planning reviews, notice,
and hearings. Flexible zoning expedites this process by permitting the
conditions to be imposed at the time of site-specific zoning approval
under a very generalized zoning authorization that is available to any
number of developers to use for different circumstances. 391
\

389. The General Assembly authorized conditional zoning in a manner that (1)
permits restrictions to protect the character and design of the area, (2) permits
post-zoning review of design, and (3) provides for enforcement and procedural
rights.
The local legislative body of a county or municipal corporation, upon
the zoning or rezoning of any land or lands ... , [I] may impose
such additional restrictions, conditions or limitations as may be deemed
appropriate to preserve, improve, or protect the general character and
design of the lands and improvements being zoned or rezoned, or of
the surrounding or adjacent lands and improvements, and [2] may,
upon the zoning or rezoning of any land or lands, retain or reserve
the power and authority to approve or disapprove the design of
buildings, construction, landscaping, or other improvements, alterations, and changes made or to be made on the subject land or lands
to assure conformity with the intent and purpose of this article and
the jurisdiction's zoning ordinance. The powers provided in this
subsection shall be applicable only if the local legislative body adopts
an ordinance [3] which shall include enforcement procedures and
requirements for adequate notice of public hearings and conditions
sought to be imposed.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 4.01(b) (1988 & Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
The authorization provided safeguards to prevent the imposition of ad hoc
conditions found so offensive in the early Maryland conditional zoning decisions. Under the statutory authorization, conditions can only be applied with
adequate notice.
390. See Board of County Comm'rs v. H. Manny Holtz, Inc., 65 Md. App. 574,
501 A.2d 489 (1985).
391. See Collard v. Incorporated Village of Flower Hill, 421 N. E.2d 818 (N. Y.
1981).
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The conditional zoning doctrine and its hostility to site-specific
use conditions pose a threat to the use of flexible zoning in Maryland.392 There are safeguards to insure that local governments exercise
conditional use powers in a responsible manner. The conditional
zoning authorization requires notice and a hearing. The new Planning
Act 3,!3 and related legislation 394 provide a firm basis for local regulatory actions grounded in consistency with state policy and a comprehensive plan. 395 These laws diminish any policy justification for
the conditional zoning doctrine to limit the newly authorized flexible
zoning techniques.
Conditional use zoning as authorized by law does not involve
the imposition of ad hoc conditions, which initially prompted judicial
hostility to its application,396 and is distinguishable from spot zoning,
contract zoning, and zoning violative of uniformity. For example,
spot zoning is simply a descriptive term involving site-specific zoning

,392. The conditional zoning doctrine is based on concerns that site specific zoning
with conditions may provide discriminatory benefits in favor of individual
property owners at the expense of the larger community and involve the zoning
authority in bargaining away public rights. The leading decision on conditional
zoning in Maryland is Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429
(1959), where the owner challenged a restrictive zoning condition that was
subsequently held invalid by the court on the basis of lack of authority,
departure from the comprehensive plan, improper restriction of the police
power by contract, and violation of uniformity. As authority for its rejection
of conditional zoning, the court relied on a decision by the Supreme Court of
Suffolk County, New York, in Church v. Town of Islip, 160 N.Y.S.2d 45
(1956), rev 'd, 190 N. Y.S.2d 297 (1959), which had invalidated a rezoning on
similar grounds. The reliance on Church was misplaced as the New York Court
of Appeals subsequently reversed the lower court ruling and upheld conditional
zoning as a valid form of flexible zoning inherently authorized by the standard
enabling act, not violative of uniformity or notions of spot zoning, and not a
form of contract zoning. Church v. Town of Islip, 168 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y.
1960). The approval of conditional zoning in New York was further explained
in Collard v. Incorporated Village of Flower Hill, 421 N.E.2d 818 (N.Y. 1981),
and . represents a growing trend of decisions supporting conditional zoning as
a flexible zoning tool necessary for the general welfare. See 2 RATHKOPF, supra
note 114, §§ 29A.02[3], 29A.03[I][cj. The New York Court of Appeals in
Collard provided a persuasive rationale for the use of conditional zoning:
Conditional rezoning is a means of achieving some degree of flexibility
in land use control by minimizing the potentially deleterious effect of
a zoning change on neighboring properties; reasonably conceived
conditions harmonize the land owner's need for rezoning with the
public interest and certainly fall within the spirit of the enabling
legislation.
Collard, 421 N.E.2d at 822.
393. H.D. 1195, 1992 Sess. (Md. 1992).
394. H.D. 457, 1992 Sess. (Md. 1992).
395. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, §§ 3.05(b), 3.06(b), 4.09 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
396. 2 RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 29A.01[c).
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different from the surrounding area,397 and is only invalid in Maryland when it is applied solely for the benefit of the property owner
without any relationship to the comprehensive plan or the general
welfare. 398 Contract zoning, which involves a bargain between the
land owner and the zoning authority, is often confused with conditional use zoning that does not involve prospective commitments. 399
Unlike contract zoning, conditional zoning does not bargain away
the police powers and the zoning can be changed in the future
without regard to the condition. 400 While uniformity is required under
the enabling law,401 courts have not applied it in a strict manner and
have permitted mixed uses, cluster development, and variations in
density or bulk that are the very characteristics of the newly authorized flexible techniques most vulnerable to the conditional zoning
doctrine. 402
Conditional use zoning, applied with appropriate safeguards, is
a modern technique that is consistent with sound planning and zoning
objectives.403 The General Assembly authorized its use in 1975 and
presumably overcame the limitations of common-law doctrine. However, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland applied a narrow
interpretation to the legislation in Board oj County Commissioner
v. H. Manny Holtz, Inc. 404 In Holtz, the Board of County Commissioner, which acts as the zoning authority for Washington County,
approved a commercial zoning classification with conditions prohibiting a convenience store and several other uses normally permitted
under the commercial zoning district. 405 The use conditions were
imposed on an ad hoc basis without prior notice, in apparent violation
of notice requirements. 406 The trial court upheld the rezoning but
found the conditions in violation of the uniformity provision and
removed them from the rezoning. 407
397. See Tennison v. Shomette, 38 Md. App. I, 379 A.2d 187 (1977); City of
Baltimore v. Byrd, 191 Md. 632, 62 A.2d 588 (1948).
398. Cassel v. City of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 73 A.2d 486 (1950).
399. Collard v. Incorporated Village of Flower Hill, 421 N.E.2d 818 (N.Y. 1981);
RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 29A.03[I][bl.
400. Cassel v. City of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 73 A.2d 486 (1950).
401. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 4.02(a) (1988).
402. Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686, 376 A.2d
483 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978); Prince George's County v. M
& B Constr. Corp., 267 Md. 338, 297 A.2d 683 (1972); Malmar Assocs. v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 260 Md. 292, 272 A.2d 6 (1971); Ellicott v.
Baltimore, 180 Md. 176, 23 A.2d 649 (1942); Wesley Inv. Co. v. County of
Alameda, 198 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Cal. App. 1984).
403. RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 29A.02[3].
404. 65 Md. App. 574, 501 A.2d 489 (1985).
405. Id. at 576-77, 501 A.2d at 490.
406. Id. at 577, 501 A.2d at 490.
407. Id. at 579, 501 A.2d at 491.
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The court of special appeals affirmed by holding that the conditional zoning authority contained in state law only applies to
physical restrictions and not use. 408 The court found that the authorization language is limited to design issues only and the permitted
uses of the zoning district must be evaluated under the uniformity
provisions. 409 The court found that the uniformity requirement prohibits haphazard application of use conditions which could establish
an endless variety of mini-use districts and undermine the very nature
of zoning. 410 Acknowledging the desirability of conditional zoning as
a flexible zoning tool, the court observed that conditional use zoning
might be applied by charter counties or under a floating zone
scheme. 411 Holtz could have been decided on narrower grounds
because of the apparent failure of the zoning authority to comply
with the notice requirements of the conditional zoning authorization .412 Instead, the court proceeded to formulate a substantive prohibition against conditional use zoning and created a potential
impediment for flexible techniques at a time when they are needed
to cope with the problems of unregulated growth.
The Holtz doctrine is unsound because it failed to distinguish
between two purposes of the authorization language. For example,
the first purpose of the authorization provides the zoning authority
with wide discretion to impose any condition deemed appropriate to
preserve, improve, or protect the character and design of the area.413
This language does not distinguish between conditions on use or
design and seems to authorize both. Certain conditions on use are
appropriate to preserve, improve, and protect the character of an
area. The second purpose of the law reserves the opportunity for
post-zoning design review. 414 The two purposes are clearly designed
for two different functions and to be applied at different times.
Nevertheless, the Holtz court seemed to read the two purposes as a
single authorization for conditions on design. The court's reliance
on uniformity takes an overly strict view of a provision that has not
been applied in this manner because variations in use have been
408. Id. at 582, 501 A.2d at 492.
409. Id. at 585-87, 501 A.2d 494-95; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 668, § 4.02(a)
(1988 & Supp. 1994).
410. 65 Md. App. at 584-85, 501 A.2d at 494. Flexible techniques, of course, allow
different forms of development for different locations and could be vulnerable
to the charge that each different form of development constitutes a mini-use
district. Mini-use districts do not undermine the integrity of zoning if consistent
with the comprehensive plan.
411. Id. at 586, 501 A.2d at 495.
412. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 668, § 4.01(b) (1988 & Supp. 1994) (element [3])
(see supra note 389 for text of statute).
413. Id. (element [I».
414. Id. (element [2».
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consistently upheld as valid zoning. 415 Moreover, the uniformity clause
does not contain any basis to distinguish between conditions on use
or physical characteristics. 416
Holtz was followed in People's Counsel jor Baltimore County
v. Mockard,417 where the zoning authority granted rezoning restricted
to a specific use. Baltimore County is a charter county and adopted
a form of site plan zoning presumably exempt from the Holtz
doctrine. The applicant did not request the site plan zoning and the
Board of Appeals applied conditions on use which the court found
to be invalid. 418 Holtz was followed again in Rodriguez v. Prince
George's County, 419 where the zoning authority applied a PUD-type
floating zone that was based on a development plan that contained
restrictions on uses and other development characteristics. The court
again invalidated the zoning because of the condition on use.420 The
Holtz doctrine has yet to be addressed by the Court of Appeals of
MarylandYI
The need to clarify the authority for conditional use zoning is
important and legislative action is necessary. State law should be
amended to explicitly authorize the imposition of conditional use
zoning so that the flexible techniques designed to implement the state
growth policy can be applied without threat of invalidation under an
outdated common-law doctrine.

D.

Vested Rights

The vested rights doctrine limits retroactive application of new
land use regulations on property.422 The purpose of the doctrine is
to provide eligible property owners with some entitlement under
regulations existing at a time when they took steps to develop their
property.423
Zoning does not confer any vested rights. 424 Property owners are
at risk when they fail to develop property under current zoning
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.

421.

422.
423.
424.

See supra note 402.
Compare MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 4.01(b) with § 4.02 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
73 Md. App. 340, 533 A.2d 1344 (1987).
[d.
79 Md. App. 537, 558 A.2d 742 (1989).
[d. at 551-52, 558 A.2d at 749.
The court of appeals, however, subsequently acknowledged that conditional
zoning as authorized by statute is on the ascendancy. See Attman/Glazer P.B.
Co. v. Mayor of Annapolis, 314 Md. 675, 686 n.8, 552 A.2d 1277, 1283 n.8
(1989).
Dainese v. Cooke, 91 U.S. 580 (1875), appears to be the first decision of the
United States Supreme Court to recognize vested rights.
Delaney, supra note 188, at 51-52; 4 RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 50.01.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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because it may be changed to more restrictive zoning and the owner
is bound by the new regulation. 425 Vested rights only accrue when
the property owner exhibits some intention to develop the property
and expends some effort to that end.426 Depending on state policy,
vested rights will accrue sometime between the time the property
owner applies for a building permit427 and actually begins construction.428
Establishing the time of vesting involves several policy considerations. Late vesting rules apply when construction is actually initiated. 429 Late vesting rules are based on concerns that nonconforming
uses will be created that are generally considered contrary to public
policy,430 and the granting of vested rights too early in the development process may undermine the public policy basis for the new
regulations. 431 Under late vesting rules, developers are considered no
more burdened by new regulations than changed economic conditions
and they can make necessary adjustments. 432 Late vesting rules indicate a preference for public policy over individual property owner
considerations.
Early vesting rules accommodate situations where developers
expend money and effort on preliminary work and these rules protect
the investment by applying the existing regulations at an early stage

425. Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 553 P.2d
546 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977).
426. Delaney, supra note 188, at 51-52.
427. Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980); Hull
v. Hunt, 331 P.2d 856 (Wash. 1958) (vest at time of application). An intermediate rule permits vested rights if substantial change occurs in the developer's
position without notice of pending change in regulations. See Cos Corp. v.
City of Evanston, 190 N.E.2d 364 (Ill. 1963); Village of Palatine v. LaSalle
Nat'l Bank, 445 N.E.2d 1277 (Ill. App. 1983).
428. In Maryland vested rights are strictly limited to circumstances where construction is started pursuant to a validly issued building permit. See 0' Donnell v.
Bassler, 289 Md. 501,425 A.2d 1003 (1981); Prince George's County v. Sunrise
Dev. Ltd. Partnership, 330 Md. 297, 623 A.2d. 1296 (1993); County Council
v. District Land Corp., 274 Md. 691, 337 A.2d 712 (1975). Some jurisdictions
do not permit vested rights until the final discretionary approval. Aries Dev.
Co. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315
(1975); Youngblood v. Board of Super. of San Diego County, 586 P.2d 586
(Cal. 1978); County of Kauai v. Pacific Std. Life Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 766
(Haw. 1982), appeal dismissed sub nom., Pacific Std. Life Ins. Co. v. Committee to Save Nukolii, 60 U.S. 1077 (1983).
429. Delaney, supra note 188, at 51-52.
430. County Council v. E.L. Gardner, Inc., 293 Md. 259, 443 A.2d 114 (1982);
Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980).
431. 4 RATHKoPF, supra note 114, § 50.03[3]; Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City
of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980).
432. County Council v. E.L. Gardner, Inc., 293 Md. 259, 443 A.2d 114 (1982);
Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980).
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in the development process, such as the point of building permit
application. 433 Early vesting rules also recognize that political pressures may develop during the early stages of a project that cause the
government to change regulations for the purpose of unfairly blocking
the project. 434
Maryland follows a strict late vesting rule that requires substantial beginnings in construction to be made under a validly issued
permit which is readily seen by the public. 435 The visibility requirement
was recently reaffirmed in Prince George's County v. Sunrise Development Limited Partnership.436 This strict rule causes a problem for
the use of flexible zoning especially in cases where development
projects are staged over time as with a large PUD. Developers often
provide substantial public facilities before more profitable stages of
construction commence. For example, a developer may provide roads,
sewers, and recreational amenities based on the expectation that
certain levels of density will be approved under the existing regulations as the project builds out to completion. 437 If regulations are
subsequently changed to a lower density and vested rights in the old
regulations are not applied, the developer loses the expected density
which supported the amenities or facilities already built. 438 Strict
vesting rules may create a disincentive for the use of flexible techniques designed to promote the state growth policy.

433. 4 RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 50.03(1).
434. An example of the problems that political pressure may create for a developer
is illustrated by the egregious fact pattern in Prince George's County v.
Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 418 A.2d 1155 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083
(1981), where the developer started to build out a properly authorized project
only to experience questionable permit revocations by local government brought
on by political opposition to the project.
435. Offen v. County Council, 96 Md. App. 526, 625 A.2d 424 (1993), rev'd on
other grounds, 334 Md. 499, 639 A.2d 1070 (1994).
436. 330 Md. 297,623 A.2d 1296 (1993).
437. Another risk for developers involves financing the.project and lenders' concerns
about certainty. Vested rights assume a valid permit but later invalidation can
terminate vested rights. Parkview Assocs. v. City of New York, 519 N.E.2d
1372 (N.Y. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 801 (1988); see William C. Haas &
Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980); United Parcel Service, Inc. v. People's Counsel
for Baltimore County, 93 Md. App. 59, 611 A.2d 993 (1992), rev'd, 336 Md.
569, 650 A.2d 226 (1994). Even with a valid permit in Maryland, vested rights
are not created without construction. Francis v. MacGill, 196 Md. 77, 75 A.2d
91 (1950).
438. An example of this situation is illustrated in Hamilton Bank v. Williamson
County Regional Planning Commission, 729 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd,
473 U.S. 172 (1985), where the developer provided infrastructure but was
denied expected density approvals and subsequently lost the project through
bankruptcy.
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In egregious situations where the regulations are changed under
circumstances where a developer relied on government actions or
tried to implement old regulations only to be deliberately thwarted
by government delaying tactics, relief may be provided by some form
of estoppel or due process remedy.439 This type of relief, however,
is uncertain and involves expensive litigation. 440
A better approach involves the use of development agreements
that establish the rights of the developer under existing regulations
in exchange for the public amenities and facilities to be provided
under the agreement. 441 These agreements, however, may be vulnerable to attack under the conditional zoning doctrine and based on
the lack of authority by the local government. Development agreements have been authorized in Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, and Nevada. 442 Maryland should join this growing list
of states and authorize development agreements. 443 The authorization
will encourage use of flexible techniques and enhance local governments' ability to enter into public-private sector agreements to provide
needed public facilities and other amenities that will promote the
state growth policy.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

The Chesapeake Bay is a major economic and recreational
resource for the region. Yet its environmental health is threatened
by poor land use regulation. Unmanaged growth is consuming huge
439. Estoppel is applied as a remedy. See Permanent Financial Corp. v. Montgomery
County, 308 Md. 239, 518 A.2d 123 (1986) (reliance on building permit issued
with reasonable interpretation will estop county from using different interpretation later); County of Charleston v. National Advertising Co., 357 S.E.2d 9
(S.c. 1987) (permit issued within general scope of authority and relied upon
to the developer's detriment will raise estoppel defense if permit later revoked);
4 RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 50.04[1]. Maryland has not yet adopted zoning
estoppel. See County Council v. Offen, 334 Md. 499, 639 A.2d 1070 (1994).
Due process also provides relief for abusive government conduct. Bateson v.
Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1988); He~rington v. Sonoma County, 834
F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989).
440. See Offen v. County Council, 96 Md. App. 526, 625 A.2d 424 (1993), rev'd
on other grounds, 334 Md. 499, 639 A.2d 1070 (1994).
441. Delaney, supra note 188; 2 RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 29A.03[1][g]. For a
thorough discussion of development agreements, see Patricia G. Hammes,
Development Agreements: The Intersection oj Real Estate Finance and Land
Use Controls, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 119 (1993).
442. 2 RATHKOPF, supra note 114, § 29A.03[I][g] n.49.
443. An authorization for development agreements is preferable to legislative modification of the Maryland Vested Rights Doctrine which is based on long
standing public policy considerations. Developers sought such a modification
in 1994, but the effort was unsuccessful. Paul D. Samuel, Vested .Development
Rights Become Issue in Legislation, DAILY RECORD, March 21, 1994, at 9.
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chunks of farmland, forests, and environmentally sensitive areas.
Lax regulatory patterns also place unanticipated burdens on local
governments to provide adequate roads, schools, and other public
facilities or services while other more suitable areas are bypassed.
Growth must be redirected to areas more suitable for development
and the current pattern of sprawl development, which represents a
major factor in pollution of the Bay, must be eliminated.
The new Planning Act contains important measures that address
these problems: a bold new land use policy to concentrate growth
only in areas where it makes sense and'to protect areas where it does
not, mandatory application of the policy to local governments, and
a mechanism for state oversight through a new Planning Commission
which will evaluate the consistency between state policy and local
actions. This policy of sensible and managed growth means substantial changes must be made in the way land use is regulated and local
governments must clearly define designated growth and protected
areas and adopt regulations necessary to insure that state policy will
be applied to these areas. The new state policy seeks to eliminate
sprawl development, the most environmentally destructive form of
development, and its success depends on effective implementation
programs.
The goals of state policy far exceed the capacity of the administrative framework designed to achieve them and, in this respect,
the legislation is incomplete. Full implementation of state policy
cannot be achieved without adequate standards, incentives, enforcement provisions, and a dispute resolution process. These measures
are needed to insure that state policy is applied as it is intended.
The Planning Commission's initial oversight activities are limited to
development of guidelines, initiation of cooperative efforts between
state and local governments, and critical evaluation of compliance
with state policy. The Commission lacks both rule-making power
and enforcement authority necessary to change existing patterns of
sprawl development that will likely continue unless local governments
are provided incentives and guidance as to how to redirect growth.
The requirement for consistency between state policy and local
actions is critical to the effectiveness of the Planning Act. The growth
policy is made mandatory on local governments through the consistency requirement and it will determine the credibility of the current
legislative approach. However, the legislation neglects to insure that
local plans and regulations are truly consistent with state policy and
not fragmented or ineffective. Without more Commission empowerment and a dispute resolution process to address conflicts in the
consistency determination, achieving consistency between state policy
and local actions will be a formidable, if not impossible, task.
New, flexible techniques are made available for local governments to assist in the implementation of the state growth policy.
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State policy requires growth to be concentrated in suitable areas
under streamlined procedures. One flexible technique that promotes
this objective is innovative zoning which is designed to provide varied
uses and densities, more efficient use of land, environmentally sensitive development, a range of community amenities, and a streamlined process. However, the application of innovative zoning techniques
by local governments is discretionary and the Commission needs
empowerment to develop incentives for their use. Legislation revisions
are also necessary to broaden the basis for application of Euclidean
zoning and eliminate a requirement for a finding of change or mistake
by non-charter counties and municipalities when applying floating
zones.
Affordable housing is another objective of state law and its need
is well established. While affordable housing was included as part of
the state growth policy, the legislation neglects to make it a mandatory element of local comprehensive plans and lacks incentives for
local governments to adopt affordable housing programs. Legislative
revisions are needed to include affordable housing as a mandatory
element of local comprehensive plans and empower the Commission
to establish minimum levels of participation.
State policy requires resource conservation and protection of
sensitive areas that can only be achieved through protective zoning
with density levels low enough to discourage sprawl development and
yet provide a reasonable use .of the land. Few local governments
have adopted protective zoning measures and the Planning Act
neglects to provide either standards or incentives for its wider use.
Protective zoning represents one of the most controversial aspects of
any resource conservation program, but it is absolutely necessary if
the state growth policy is to be achieved. The use of TDRs provides
a measure of relief for property owners burdened by protective
zoning. The Commission must be empowered to develop standards
and incentives to promote this aspect of state policy.
The original Visions of 2020 contemplated a policy that funding
mechanisms be in place to support growth. The Planning Act represents a substantial retreat from this policy that needs to be restored
so that growth only takes place where it is suitable; that is, where
public facilities and services are adequate. Local governments need
standards and incentives to adopt growth management regulations
that provide the basis for funding mechanisms involving participation
of the private as well as public sectors.
Potential impediments to the achievement of state policy, such
as represented by the takings challenge and the shifting presumption
of validity, can best be addressed by providing local governments
with clear policy direction and incentives to use new flexible techniques. Conditional zoning and vested rights doctrines operate as
detriments to the effective use of the new flexible techniques, and
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further legislation is necessary to authorize both conditional uses and
development agreements.
The Planning Act represents a modest beginning in the unfinished
process of significantly increasing the state's role in land use planning
and regulation. Current deficiencies in the law need to be promptly
corrected before damage caused by unmanaged growth takes too
great a toll on the environment and an opportunity to correct
destructive land use practices is irretrievably lost. The bold promises
encapsulated in the state growth policy require equally bold implementation measures if local governments are to change the way they
regulate land use and require more sensible development patterns.

